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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950720-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for (a) burglary, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1995), plus gang enhancement, and (b) theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), plus 
gang enhancement, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995), Presumption of innocence 
-- "Element of the offense" defined. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995), Criminal responsibility 
for direct commission of offense or for conduct of another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), Offenses committed by 
three or more persons -- Enhanced penalties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1995), Court to determine law; 
the jury, the facts. 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 13, Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 24, Utah Constitution. 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the inclusion of (1) actus rea, (2) mens rea, 
and (3) an enhanced penalty in a penal statute is sufficient to 
create a separate offense entitling a criminal defendant to a 
preliminary hearing, the presumption of innocence until each 
2 
element is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury, pursuant 
to Article I, sections 12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution, and 
Utah statutory law. 
2. Whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), which (a) 
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited so that she/he may govern 
her/his conduct accordingly, (b) delegates basic policy matters 
to judges, and (c) interferes with a person's right to 
association under the First Amendment to the federal 
Constitution, is vague and arbitrary in violation of the due 
process provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions. 
3. Whether interfering with a criminal defendant's 
fundamental rights during a proceeding that requires the state to 
make a showing concerning, among other things, the defendant's 
culpable mental state violates Article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
4. Whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), which 
creates a sub-class of criminal defendants and unreasonably 
interferes with their fundamental rights, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the federal Constitution and Article I, 
section 24, of the Utah Constitution. 
All of the issues presented on appeal are questions of law, 
with respect to which this Court will not defer in any degree to 
the trial court but will review the trial court's determinations 
for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
3 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Christopher Cheeney ("Cheeney") filed a Motion to 
Strike Gang Enhancement with the trial court, raising the 
following issues: Whether Section 76-3-203.1 violates specific 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, including a criminal 
defendant's right to a preliminary hearing, the presumption of 
innocence, and a jury; whether Section 76-3-203.1 violates the 
due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions; 
whether Section 76-3-203.1 should be stricken under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine; and whether Section 76-3-203.1 violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution and the 
Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the Utah Constitution. 
The issues are preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 40-48. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
In an Information dated January 18, 1995, the State charged 
Cheeney with numerous counts of burglary, a third degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), with gang 
enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995); and 
theft, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-4 04 (1995), with gang enhancement pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995). (R. 8-12.) Cheeney entered a guilty 
plea in connection with one count of burglary and one count of 
theft, plus gang enhancement, pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The parties specifically conditioned 
4 
the plea upon the preservation of Cheeney's right to appeal the 
constitutionality of Section 76-3-203.1. (R. 027-37, 111.) 
Thereafter, Cheeney filed with the trial court a motion and 
supporting memorandum to strike the enhancement statute. (R. 
040-48.) The trial court denied the motion and entered judgement 
against Cheeney, sentencing him to a term not to exceed five 
years plus gang enhancement for burglary, and to a term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years plus gang 
enhancement for theft. (R. 090-94.) Cheeney appeals from that 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CHEENEY PLED GUILTY TO BURGLARY AND THEFT PLUS GANG 
ENHANCEMENT IN A SEEY-TYPE PLEA AGREEMENT IN ORDER THAT HE 
COULD CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-203.1. 
On January 18, 1995, the State charged Bryan 0. Rasmussen, 
aka Brian Anderson ("Rasmussen"), Michael Chad Hoffman 
("Hoffman"), and Christopher Cheeney ("Cheeney") by Information 
with several counts of burglary, a third degree felony under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and theft, a second degree felony under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. (R. 008-012.) The State provided 
notice in the Information that "pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§76-3-203.1, . . . the defendants are subject to an enhanced 
penalty as provided in that section because the above offense [s 
were] committed in concert with two or more persons." (Id.) 
On September 8, 1995, Cheeney filed a Statement of 
Defendant, which provides that Cheeney entered a plea of guilty 
5 
to the crimes of burglary and theft, with enhanced penalties, 
(R. 028-32.) Cheeney's plea is explicitly conditioned on his 
preservation of the ability to challenge the constitutionality of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 and to withdraw the plea if it is 
determined on appeal that the statute is unconstitutional. (R. 
036, 111 ("The State agrees that Defendant's plea shall be in the 
nature of a Sery plea and, therefore, conditioned upon the 
preservation of Defendant's right to appeal the constitutionality 
of the Gang Enhancement Statute").) State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In connection with Cheeney's plea, the trial court issued a 
finding that Cheeney was "subject to an enhanced penalty as 
provided in [Section 76-3-203.1]" (R. 038-39, 092, 094), and 
entered judgment against Cheeney on October 20, 1995, for 
burglary plus gang enhancement (R. 091), and theft plus gang 
enhancement. (R. 093.) The trial court sentenced Cheeney to 
serve concurrent terms for the offenses (R. 091-94, 142), and 
ordered that Cheeney would be jointly and severally liable with 
"[his] friend, if not co-gang member, Rasmussen" to pay 
restitution in the amount of $61,900. (R. 142.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 identifies a specific actus rea 
and a specific mens rea that must be proved before a criminal 
defendant is subjected to the enhanced penalty identified in the 
statute. The statute has all the makings of a separate criminal 
offense. However, Section 76-3-203.1 by its terms carves out a 
6 
criminal defendant's right to a preliminary hearing, to the 
presumption of innocence until the elements of the offense have 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and to a jury in a 
proceeding to determine whether the statute has been violated. 
The statute, therefore, is violative of the Utah Constitution and 
must be stricken. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 is also void-for-vagueness in 
violation of the federal due process clause. The statute fails 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, is susceptible to 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and interferes with 
sensitive First Amendment freedoms. It must be stricken on that 
basis. 
In addition, Section 76-3-203.1 violates the due process 
provision of the Utah Constitution by failing to provide full and 
fair disclosure to a criminal defendant, who is charged under the 
statute. Although the statute requires the state to prove in a 
separate proceeding that the criminal defendant engaged "in 
concert[ed]" conduct with others in the commission of the 
underlying offense, the statute deprives the criminal defendant 
of the full panoply of due process guarantees in that separate 
proceeding, including the right to a preliminary hearing, the 
presumption of innocence, and a jury. 
Finally, Section 76-3-203.1 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the federal Constitution and the Uniform Operation of 
Laws provision of the Utah Constitution. The statute creates a 
7 
sub-class of criminal defendants who are subjected to an enhanced 
criminal penalty for associating with others. Because the 
statute interferes with the fundamental right of association, the 
strict scrutiny test applies. The statute must be stricken 
unless the state can show that it is necessary to a compelling 
state interest. The state legislature has identified the "state 
interest" as the elimination of gang-related crime. Clearly, the 
elimination of crime can never be so compelling that it 
interferes with rights guaranteed by the state and federal 
constitutions. 
Further, under the "rational tendency" analysis of Article 
I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, the statute cannot be 
justified. The objective of the statute is to lock-up ganglords; 
the tendency of the statute is to enhance the sentences of 
persons who have no gang relations. The statute does not have a 
reasonable tendency to further the legislative objective. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IN ONE FELL SWOOP, THE UTAH LEGISLATURE 
CREATED A SEPARATE OFFENSE AND TOOK AWAY CERTAIN 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN A PROCEEDING FOR DETERMINING 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED THAT OFFENSE. 
In 1990, the Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.1, which provides in part the following: 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons is 
subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as 
provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used 
in this section means the defendant and two or more 
other persons would be criminally liable for the 
8 
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an 
indictment is returned, shall cause to be subscribed 
upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or the 
information or indictment in felony cases notice that 
the defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties 
provided under this section. The notice shall be in a 
clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
offense charged. 
* * * 
(3) (a) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
[90 days in a secure facility if the offense is a 
class B misdemeanor, graduating to a minimum term 
of 20 years if the offense is a capital offense 
for which a life sentence is imposed.] 
* * * 
(5) (b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons with whom 
the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not 
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that 
any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a 
different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty 
under this section. The imposition of the penalty is 
contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that 
this section is applicable. In conjunction with 
sentencing the court shall enter written findings of 
fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of the sentence required under this section if the 
court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be 
best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstance justifying 
the disposition on the record and in writing. 
The statute also states that the provisions do "not create any 
separate offense", apparently in an effort to circumvent due 
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process and equal protection considerations. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.1(5) (a) (1995). Notwithstanding subsection (5) (a) , the 
statute crosses the line to define a separate substantive offense 
by combining a mental state with a criminal act for the purpose 
of enhancing a sentence. Thus, it must be analyzed on 
constitutional grounds. 
A. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE LEGISLATION IS NOT MET 
BY THE STATUTE. 
1. The Legislative History of Section 76-3-203.1. 
Although the purpose of Section 76-3-203.1 is not clear on 
its face, it is reflected in the legislative history. 
Legislative sponsors sought to enact the statute in order to 
eradicate "gang-related" crime. Senator Fordham stated: 
Originally, we had a bill called the "Organization Gang 
Bill." In working with California, who this bill was 
patterned after . . . and after they passed their law, 
we had an influx of gang members coming from California 
and infiltrating into Utah and establishing residence 
here and working . . . in their organization as members 
[] who had broken off from the California gangs. I 
think we need to send a message to these organized 
people that there isn't a place for them in Utah. 
(R. 084.) Representative Rushton also expressed that the 
objective of Section 76-3-203.1 was to combat the gang-organized 
crime stemming from "California-based crack cocaine franchises," 
and that the statute was designed to apply in those narrow 
circumstances: 
The idea [here and] behind the enhanced penalties in 
California . . . was to get that . . . core group of 
hardened criminals that supplies the money, [] the 
impetus for a true criminal street gang. . . . [This 
leaves the social workers] to work with the remainder 
of the young people at risk in these gangs. 
(R. 077-79.) During floor debates, Representative Joann Milner 
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expressed that legislators should take personal responsibility in 
their districts for gang problems and work to rehabilitate local 
street gang members. (R. 080.) In response, Rushton stated: 
[T]his law is directed at the core, it's not directed, 
as Joann has expressed, [at] kids that are at risk, you 
see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap turned 
around backwards on the West, or they sign X [to each] 
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each 
gang has its own finger sign. . . . This bill is 
directed at that core criminal element, that three 
percent of those six hundred gang members that have 
been identified that provide the father figure in these 
gangs. And they provide also the connection [to] the 
California gangs, the connection to the crack cocaine, 
the money that is fueling this explosion of gang 
activity in our cities. 
(R. 083.) 
To meet their objective, legislators claim they duplicated 
and modified slightly, a California statute that they believed 
was violative of that state's constitution. Rushton stated: 
Fordham and myself became alarmed about [street gang 
issues] in about July of last year. We inquired of the 
Los Angeles County Attorney's Office on what was being 
done to prevent street gangs in there, they told us 
about a piece of legislation in California called "The 
Street Terrorism Prevention Act." We brought a copy of 
that act to Utah, we got a lot of literature about it, 
and we had a bill written up that patterned the Street 
Terrorism Act. But since that time that [A]ct has run 
into constitutional problems in California, so we had 
representatives from SWAP, do a lot of research on it, 
and they came up . . . with this bill, the group 
criminal activities penalty, which they feel confident 
avoids the constitutional problems of the California 
Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool. It 
doesn't have the political or the psychological effects 
that our original Street Terrorism had, because we used 
the term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our 
[original] bill, and they told us this was the reason 
why it would become constitutionally unsound. So if 
you read the bill it will not have the [phrase] "street 
gang" in it. 
(R. 078-79) . The similarities and differences between the Utah 
statute and the California Act are set forth below. 
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2. The Current California Act and the Utah Statute 
Are Markedly Distinguishable. 
The California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention 
Act" was originally enacted in 1988. Cal. Penal Code § 186.20, et 
seq. (West). Notwithstanding Representative Rushton's comments, 
it is still in force today and has been upheld in the face of 
various constitutional challenges, most notably In re Alberto R., 
235 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 348 (1991), and People v. 
Gamez, 235 Cal. App.3d 957, 286 Cal.Rptr. 894 (1991). (A copy of 
the Act and cases is attached hereto as Addendum C.) The statute 
will be repealed by its terms on January 1, 1997. Cal. Penal 
Code § 186.22(g) (West). 
The California Act is similar to the Utah statute in the 
following respects: 
o It imposes minimum mandatory sentences on persons 
who violate certain provisions of the statute. 
Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(4), (c), (d). 
o It permits the court to suspend imposition of the 
enhanced sentence "where the interests of justice 
would best be served, if the court specifies on 
the record and enters into the minutes the 
circumstances indicating that the interests of 
justice would best be served by that disposition." 
Id. at § 186.22(d). 
o It is a violation of the Act if one of the 
enumerated offenses is committed "by two or more 
persons." Id. at § 186.22(e); cf. note 1, infra. 
The provisions of the California Act depart from the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 in at least the 
following respects: 
o The California legislature specifically recognized 
in the Act the constitutional right of every 
citizen to lawfully associate with others who 
12 
share similar beliefs, and states in the Act that 
it intends to eradicate street gang criminal 
activity by "focusing upon patterns of criminal 
gang activity and upon the organized nature of 
street gangs, which together, are the chief source 
of terror created by street gangs." Cal. Penal 
Code § 186.21. 
o The California legislature recognized that the Act 
was urgently and overwhelmingly necessary. It 
specifically found violent street gang activities 
to "present a clear and present danger to public 
order and safety". Lawmakers studied the 
California crisis before passing the Act into law. 
In Los Angeles alone, "there were 328 gang-related 
murders in 1986, and [] gang homicides in 1987 [] 
increased 80 percent over 1986." Id. at § 186.21. 
o The Act creates a separate, substantive criminal 
offense by making it unlawful for a person to 
actively participate in "any criminal street gang 
with knowledge that its members engage in or have 
engaged in a pattern of criminal crancr activity, 
and [any person] who willfully promotes, furthers, 
or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by 
members of that gang, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to 
exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state 
prison for 16 months, or 2 or 3 years." Id. at § 
186.22 (a) -1 
O In addition to creating the separate, substantive 
offense, the Act contains an enhanced sentencing 
provision. Id. at § 186.22(b). That provision 
subjects any person who is convicted of a felony 
to an enhanced sentence if the felony was 
committed "for the benefit of, at the direction 
of, or in association with any criminal street 
1
 Section 186.22(e) of the California Act defines "pattern of 
criminal gang activity" as the commission of two or more of the 
specifically enumerated offenses "Jbv two or more persons". 
The "pattern" language is used only in subsection (a) of the Act, 
which creates a separate, substantive offense. See People v. Gamez, 286 
Cal.Rptr. at 974. 
In drafting the Utah statue, legislators apparently copied and 
modified the California Act by stating that a person violates the Utah 
statute by committing one of the enumerated offenses in concert "with two 
or more persons". Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1) (a) (1995) . However, 
legislators apparently failed to realize that they were copying that 
portion of the California Act that creates a separate, substantive 
offense. 
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gang, with the specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang 
members." Id. 
o The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
District recognized that before a violation of the 
enhanced sentencing provision could be upheld, it 
must consider whether the trier of fact found the 
essential elements of the provision "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. 
Rptr. at 906. 
o The California Act defines "criminal street gang" 
as an "ongoing organization, association, or group 
of three or more persons . . . having as one of 
its primary activities the commission of one or 
more of the criminal acts enumerated in [the 
statute], having a common name or common 
identifying sign or symbol, and whose members 
individually or collectively engage in or have 
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity." 
Cal. Penal Code § 186,22(f). 
o California courts are required to apply the Act in 
the narrowest and strictest of circumstances. See 
Alberto R., 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 355. 
The differences between the California Act and the Utah 
statute emphasize the problems with the Utah statute: Because the 
Utah legislature failed to adopt clarifying definitions and 
specific language relating to the purpose of the statute, the 
Utah statute violates important constitutional guarantees, where 
the California Act does not. 
B. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 VIOLATES EXPLICIT 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
In a proceeding to determine whether a defendant has 
violated Section 76-3-203.1, the statute by its terms eliminates 
a defendant's right to be presumed innocent until the elements of 
the offense are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, to a jury 
trial, and to a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause. 
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Each of those rights are explicitly guaranteed to a criminal 
defendant and protected against state action under the Utah 
Constitution and well-established law. See Utah Const, art. I, 
§§ 12 and 13 (respectively, right to a jury and to a preliminary 
hearing); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-501 (1995) (right to be presumed 
innocent) and 77-17-10 (1995) (right to a jury); In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) (right to be 
presumed innocent). By interfering with those rights, Section 
76-3-203.1 violates specific provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
1. The Statute Interferes with a Defendant's Right to 
Be Presumed Innocent Until the Elements of the Offense 
Are Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
Fundamental to Utah's criminal jurisprudence is the 
proposition that a person is presumed innocent "until each 
element of the offense11 charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) (emphasis 
added); accord State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v. Murphy, 
617 P.2d 399, 402 n.5 (Utah 1980); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 
466, 468-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 
L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) (the due process clause 
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged"). 
The phrase "element of the offense" is defined at Section 
76-1-501(2)(b) as the criminal defendant's "culpable mental 
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state."2 Accordingly, when a penal statute requires proof of a 
criminal defendant's culpable mental state, the proof must meet 
the "reasonable doubt" standard. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) 
and (2)(b) (1995); see also People v. Gamez, 286 Cal.Rptr. at 
906; State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792, 794-95 (Ariz. 1987) (because 
the enhancement statute required proof of the defendant's 
culpability, defendant was entitled to a jury and the presumption 
of innocence); State v. Hurley, 741 P.2d 257, 263 (Ariz. 1987) 
(because sentencing statute did not require additional evaluation 
of mens rea, the need for a jury trial and findings by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is less compelling). 
In construing Section 76-3-2 03.1, the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994), implicitly 
determined that the statute requires proof of the defendant's 
"culpable mental state" before the enhanced penalty will be 
imposed. Specifically, the court rejected the argument that 
persons with whom the criminal defendant "acted in concert must 
be parties to the offense . . . and possess the [culpable] mental 
2
 Section 76-1-501 provides the following: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to 
be innocent until each element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such 
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
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state required for that offense." Id. Rather, the defendant's 
responsibility "is determined by his own mental state." Id. 
(quoting. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983)). 
Since the defendant must bear the responsibility for 
violating Section 76-3-203.1, his responsibility is determined by 
his mental state; therefore, the state must prove the defendant 
had the "culpable mental state" to engage in concerted conduct. 
Sister states require a showing of "purpose", "conscious action", 
"intent", and "knowledge", for "in concert" conduct. See Gilbert 
H. Moen Company v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 878 P.2d 1246, 
1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added) ("In concert" action 
requires that the "actors consciously act together in an unlawful 
manner"); Elliott v. Barnes, 645 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1982) (for action in concert, "the following three elements must 
exist: (1) A concert of action; (2) a unity of purpose or design; 
(3) two or more defendants working separately but to a common 
purpose and each acting with the knowledge and consent of the 
others"); State v. Kister, 1995 WL 731213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); 
Black's Law Dictionary 262 (5th ed. 1979) (Concerted action: 
"Action that has been planned, arranged, adjusted, agreed on and 
settled between parties acting together pursuant to some design 
or scheme"). 
Accordingly, the "in concert" element in Section 76-3-203.1 
requires proof of the defendant's mental culpability and must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
501(2) (b) (1995). Any lesser standard invites perfunctory 
application and chisels away at the connection that must be 
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established between the defendant and the "two or more other 
persons"; it inappropriately permits application of Section 76-3-
203.1 on mere testimony that other unidentified persons were 
somewhere in the area at the time the defendant committed the 
underlying offense. 
"In concert" conduct is the subjective element of a separate 
substantive offense (the mens rea), and the conviction of the 
underlying offense is the objective element (the actus rea). In 
addition to and after proving that the criminal defendant had the 
requisite culpability to commit the underlying offense, the state 
must show the actus rea and the mens rea identified in Section 
76-3-203.1 -- that the criminal defendant had the culpable mental 
state to act in concert with two or more persons in the 
commission of that offense.3 
The statute creates a separate criminal offense that if 
violated subjects the criminal defendant to an enhanced penalty. 
Because it denies a criminal defendant the fundamental right to 
be presumed innocent until the elements are proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is unconstitutional and must be stricken. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 Interferes with a 
Criminal Defendant's Right to a Jury. 
The Utah Constitution and statutory law afford persons 
charged with serious offenses the right to a jury. Article I, 
section 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1995); Utah Rules of 
3
 "In concert" conduct also may be construed to describe both the 
proscribed conduct and attendant circumstances of an offense, thereby 
making "in concert" conduct an "element of the offense" under Section 76-
1-501(2)(a). 
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Criminal Procedure 17. Since before Utah's statehood, Utah 
courts have construed that right to engage when the issue is one 
of fact in a criminal proceeding. People v. Biddlecome, 3 Utah 
208, 2 P. 194, 198 (1882) ("By the statute the jurors are made 
the sole judges of the facts"). It is well established that the 
jury is provided with the sole ability to judge the facts in 
criminal matters and to weigh the evidence. The law prohibits 
the judge from invading that province. See State v. Green, 78 
Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931); State v. Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290 
P. 727, 731 (1930); State v. Bruno, 69 Utah 444, 256 P. 109, 110 
(1927); State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P. 987, 989 (1908); 
State v. James, 32 Utah 152, 89 P. 460, 463 (1907); Biddlecome, 2 
P. at 198.4 
A criminal defendant's mental state traditionally is a 
question of fact for the jury. Because Section 76-3-203.1 
requires proof of the defendant's mental state, it identifies an 
issue of fact in a criminal proceeding that must be presented to 
the jury. However, because the legislature has directed that 
the factual issues be determined by a judge, the statute invades 
the province of the jury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (c) . 
If the jury is prevented by the legislature from making 
4
 The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution likewise 
protects the Sixth Amendment right to a jury from state action. See 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 88 S.Ct. 1444 (1968) 
(the right to a jury trial for the criminal defendant is protected from 
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution) ; 
see also Medlock v. 1985 Ford F 150 Pick Up, 417 S.E.2d 85, 87 (S.C. 
1992) ("The legislature cannot abrogate the right to a jury trial" simply 
with labels) . 
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findings of fact, a criminal defendant is denied a fundamental 
right in violation of Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. See State v. Anderson, 603 A.2d 928 (N.J. 1992) 
(court concluded that statute specifying that "materiality" would 
be determined by the court as a question of law violated the 
state constitution); State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 778 (Or. 
1982); State v. Ouinn, 623 P.2d 630 (Or. 1981) (right to have all 
elements of a crime decided by jury, guaranteed by the Oregon 
Constitution, was violated by death penalty statute that allowed 
court rather than jury to determine defendant's mental state in 
committing crime of murder, for purposes of imposing death 
sentence).5 
5
 Section 76-3-203.1 is distinguishable from the minimum mandatory 
sentencing statute identified in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 
91 L.Ed.2d 67, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986) . In that case, anyone convicted of 
certain felonies was subjected to a minimum mandatory sentence of five 
years imprisonment if the sentencing judge determined from the evidence 
presented at trial and additional evidence offered by either party that 
the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the 
felony offense. As the Court recognized, the Pennsylvania legislature 
"simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing 
courts to bear on punishment -- the instrumentality used in committing 
a violent felony -- and dictated the precise weight to be given that 
factor if the instrumentality is a firearm." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-
90, 91 L.Ed.2d at 78-79. 
Section 76-3-203.1 differs from the Pennsylvania statute in that it 
requires proof of "in concert" conduct, which goes to the defendant's 
culpability. The "in concert" factor is not traditionally considered by 
sentencing courts. In addition, determining the culpability of a 
defendant for sentencing purposes is far more complicated and more 
intrusive than determining whether the defendant used a firearm in the 
commission of an offense, because it requires more than merely observing 
that the defendant fired a gun at the victim or brandished a weapon 
during a robbery. It requires probing the defendant's mental state to 
determine whether it was in the defendant's mind that the "other persons" 
be implicated in the crime, or whether it was in the defendant's mind to 
commit the crime alone, and the other persons were unexpected and 
unexpecting companions. Because "in concert" conduct is more complicated 
to prove, the risk is greater that the proof will be misunderstood. 
Consequently, it should be an issue for the jury requiring the heightened 
standard of proof: "beyond a reasonable doubt". 
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Requiring a jury determination of at least the "in concert" 
element would bring Section 76-3-203.1 into accord with similar 
Utah provisions. Utah law provides for a jury determination and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt both under the dangerous weapon 
enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995)) and the 
habitual criminal statutes (Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001, et. seq. 
(1995)) . In capital cases, aggravating circumstances must be 
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 577-80. 585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, Durham, 
and Zimmerman, JJ., in separate opinions, collectively holding 
that aggravating circumstances are elements of the crime which 
the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Section 76-3-203.1 serves a purpose similar to those provisions. 
The same right to a jury should apply. Because the statute 
interferes with that right, it must be stricken. 
3. Section 76-3-203.1 Violates Article I, Section 13 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution requires, in 
pertinent part, that offenses be prosecuted "by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the 
State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and 
commitment." The accused's right to a preliminary hearing is a 
substantial one. State v. Pay, 45 Utah 412, 146 P. 300 (1915). 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that unless a criminal defendant 
is subjected to a preliminary examination for the violation of a 
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criminal statute, the prosecution is not authorized to continue 
with a proceeding relating to the violation. State v. Jensen, 103 
Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1943); State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 
125, 71 P.2d 196, 199 (1937); State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 
P. 860, 861 (1918). 
By enacting Section 76-3-203.1, the legislature has denied a 
criminal defendant the right to a preliminary hearing in 
connection with allegations that he/she violated the statute. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(2)(a) and (5)(a) (1995). Because 
Section 76-3-203.1 creates a separate criminal offense that 
subjects a criminal defendant to an enhanced sentence, a criminal 
defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing. Section 76-3-
203.l's failure to recognize this substantial right renders it 
unconstitutional. 
POINT II. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 IS VOID-FOR-
VAGUENESS UNDER A FEDERAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS. 
Section 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional under a federal due 
process analysis. Basic principles of due process prohibit the 
enactment of a statute if it is vague on its face. 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, 
because we assume that man is free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give 
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may 
act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by 
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws 
must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. Third, but related, where a vague statute 
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f,abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment 
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of 
[those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead 
citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' 
. . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas 
were clearly marked." 
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 33 L.Ed.2d 
222, 227-28, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909, 103 
S.Ct. 1855 (1983); Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 
816, 819 (Utah 1991). In applying the Gravned test to state 
legislation, the United States Supreme Court has expressed less 
tolerance for enactments that carry criminal penalties. Village 
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 498-99, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-72, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982). The 
Court has explained that the vagueness doctrine is critical with 
respect to a legislative failure to provide sufficient guidelines 
concerning the application of a penal statute. 
Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual 
freedoms within a frame work of ordered liberty. 
Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined 
for substantive authority and content as well as for 
definiteness or certainty of expression. 
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Although the 
doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and 
arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that 
the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is 
not actual notice, but the other principal element of 
the doctrine -- the requirement that a legislature 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide 
such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit 
"a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, 
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
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predilections." 
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (citations omitted). Since a 
violation of Section 76-3-203.1 carries an enhanced criminal 
penalty, the Court should be intolerant of the additional due 
process considerations it breaches, as set forth below. 
A. SECTION 76-3-203.1 FAILS TO GIVE THE PERSON OF 
ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO KNOW 
WHAT IS PROHIBITED. 
The first consideration under Grayned is whether a statute 
gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity 
to know what is prohibited so that he may govern himself 
accordingly. See State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986) 
(vague penal law stricken under due process analysis). Section 
76-3-203.1 fails that consideration in two respects. 
First, Section 76-3-203.1 provides that a criminal defendant 
may be in violation of the statute if he has acted "in concert 
with two or more persons", even if the persons "with whom the 
actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, 
apprehended, charged, or convicted," or "those persons are 
charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (b) (1995) . A person of ordinary 
intelligence should not be required to decipher what it means to 
act "in concert" with two or more unidentified or uncharged 
persons, especially where the puzzling concept carries with it 
the possibility of an enhanced sentence for the alleged conduct. 
See State v. Brown, 629 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1994). Since the statute 
may be applied based on the actions of unidentified, uncharged 
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individuals, a criminal defendant is denied notice of the 
allegations and is precluded from meeting them. 
Second, the legislative history of Section 76-3-203.1 
reflects that the statute is intended to be enforced in select 
cases involving gangs and is intended to target ganglords. See 
Argument, Point I.A.I. The intent of the legislation is not 
reflected in the plain language of the statute, leaving the 
manner of enforcement in question. 
In Alberto R., 235 Cal.App.3d at 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d at 
348, the defendant urged the court to find the California Act 
unconstitutional on the basis that it was void-for-vagueness. The 
court rejected the argument and determined that the Act did not 
require persons of ordinary intelligence to guess at the 
applicability of the statute, in part because the plain language 
of the Act specified that it focused on "criminal street gangs" 
and it clearly defined that phrase. Alberto R., 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 
354, 357. The intent of the legislature was set forth in the 
language of the Act, thereby ensuring strict and narrow 
application of its provisions. Id. at 355. 
The vagueness issues surrounding Utah's statute cannot be so 
easily resolved. Until the focus of Section 76-3-203.1 is 
clearly identified and defined, persons cannot be expected to 
conform their conduct to the statute. 
B. SECTION 76-3-203.1 IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO ARBITRARY AND 
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT. 
The second consideration under Grayned is whether the law 
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provides sufficiently explicit standards for those who apply it 
in order that it will not be arbitrarily and discriminately 
enforced. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to police, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. Section 76-3-203.1 impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to judges for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, as reflected in the legislative history 
and the text of the statute. 
According to the legislative history, judges are expected to 
use their discretion in determining whether Section 76-3-203.1 
applies, as reflected in Representative Rushton's statements: 
[T]he sentencing judge, rather than the jury, shall 
decide whether to impose the penalty. We are not going 
to make any effort to take the judicial discretion out 
of this penalty phase. It will give the judge the 
right, if he feels that an individual needs to be taken 
out of that situation for this enhanced period of time, 
the judge still has the discretion to either take him 
out for an enhanced period of time or . . . not. 
(R. 079.) In response to questions concerning the broad language 
of the statute, and whether persons who are not members of actual 
gangs will be convicted under the statute of "essentially gang 
activities", Representative Rushton assured legislators that 
judicial discretion could be trusted to apply the statute in the 
limited, gang-related circumstances intended. (R. 079.) 
Legislators intended that judges decide whether to apply the 
statute to every person convicted of a crime "in concert" with 
"two or more persons," or only those persons associated with 
gangs. (R. 079.) 
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Likewise, the text permits the judge to apply or suspend 
application of the statute at whim. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(6) (1995). It encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing 
to clearly define how the interests of justice are served by 
suspending, on the one hand, or enforcing, on the other hand, the 
statute. Justice Howe described the hazards of such a statute: 
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature 
could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside 
and say who could be rightfully detained, and who 
should be set at large. This would, to some extent, 
substitute the judicial for the legislative department 
of the government. 
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Utah 1986) (Howe, J., 
concurring) (quoting, U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 
2d 563 (1875)). Section 76-3-203.1 casts a large net, and leaves 
it to the courts to decide who will be subjected to the 
enhancement and who will not. The California Act avoids the 
issue of arbitrary enforcement in part by defining the phrase, 
and clearly articulating that the Act applies to, "criminal 
street gangs." Cal. Penal Code § 186.22 (West). 
The Utah statute also leaves a matter of procedure to the 
discretion of judges by failing to identify the burden of proof 
that must be met by the state in order for the criminal defendant 
to be found in violation of the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(5) (c) (1995) . . Judges may apply various burdens of proof to 
justify the findings, making application of the statute arbitrary 
and capricious. As set forth above (Point I.A.2., supra), the 
California courts avoid that issue by recognizing that the fact 
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finder must apply the heightened burden of proof, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, to determine whether the Act has been violated. 
In order to be constitutional, the legislature is required 
to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. 
Otherwise, it has provided a "standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58; Gravned, 408 U.S. 
at 109. The vague provisions of the Utah gang enhancement 
statute may be used improperly by judges who might be consciously 
or subconsciously inclined to discriminate against certain 
classes of individuals. See e.g., Gravned. 408 U.S. at 108-09. 
Inasmuch as the constitution protects those most vulnerable to 
governmental discrimination, Section 76-3-203.1 must be stricken. 
C. SECTION 76-3-203.1 INTERFERES WITH SENSITIVE FIRST 
AMENDMENT FREEDOMS. 
The third consideration under Gravned is whether the statute 
inhibits the exercise of "basic First Amendment freedoms". While 
criminal conduct in association with others clearly is not 
protected by the First Amendment, see Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494, 516-17, 95 L.Ed.2d 1137, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951), mere 
association with others is. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 
2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 S.Ct. 1163 (1958) ("[I]t is beyond debate that 
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs 
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
embraces freedom of speech"). 
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In the event the state is not required to prove that the 
criminal defendant had the requisite mental capacity to act "in 
concert with two or more persons" in the commission of the 
offense (see Point I.B.I., supra), the statute is not limited in 
its application to penalizing criminal conduct in association 
with others. Its application becomes much broader than that --
the statue penalizes mere association with other persons. 
Because the state is not required to prove the mental state, 
identity or conviction of the persons with whom the criminal 
defendant allegedly associated in the commission of the offense, 
see State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 450; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(5) (b) (1995), the possibility of receiving an enhanced 
penalty merely for associating with two or more persons exists 
based on the mere identification of the criminal defendant in 
association with other persons. The statute causes citizens to 
fI/steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked" and to 
avoid the association of other persons in order to avoid the 
uncertainty of the enforcement of the statute. 
Again, the California Act avoids violating a person's 
freedom of association in a number of ways, including the 
following: (1) It makes "intentional" and "knowing" conduct 
actionable -- the specific intent phrases save it from being too 
vague or broad in its application, see Cal. Penal Code § 
186.22(a), (b), and Alberto R., 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 353-54, 357; (2) 
it specifically exempts from the Act "employees engaged in 
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concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection, or the 
activities of labor organizations or their members or agents," 
Cal. Penal Code § 186.23; (3) it clearly defines "criminal street 
gang" as an organization having as one of its primary activities 
the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in 
the statute, Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(f); (4) it is very narrowly 
and strictly applied and its elements must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Alberto R., 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 354; Gamez, 286 
Cal.Rptr. at 906. The Utah statute is void of those safeguards. 
D. SECTION 76-3-203.1 FAILS THE UTAH RATIONAL MANNER 
ANALYSIS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that Article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution required that portions of a statute governing the 
sentencing of mentally ill offenders be stricken because the 
statutory provisions were arbitrary and capricious. They bore no 
rational relationship to the purposes of the statute. Id. at 
1272. As set forth at Point I.A. of the Argument, supra, the 
Utah legislators expected and intended the gang enhancement 
statute to eradicate gang-related crime. The statute is far more 
reaching in its application than it was intended and is not 
logically related to the purpose identified by the legislature. 
See Argument, Point I.A., supra, and IV.B., infra. For that 
reason it must be stricken as violative of Article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution. 
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POINT III. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS WRITTEN IMPORTANT 
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS OUT OF § 76-3-203.1 PROCEEDINGS 
IN VIOLATION OF STATE DUE PROCESS. 
The statute also is unconstitutional under a state due 
process analysis. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
"fundamental fairness requires that procedures both in the guilt 
phase and in the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding be 
designed to insure that the decision-making process is based on 
accurate information." State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 
1980); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) 
("Procedural fairness is as obligatory at the sentencing phase of 
a trial as at a guilt phase"). In order to meet that 
requirement, the court looked to the Oregon Supreme Court's 
approach in Buchea v. Sullivan, 262 Or. 222, 497 P.2d 1169 
(1977), and recognized a criminal defendant's right to counsel, 
to exculpatory evidence, and to be confronted by witnesses in the 
guilt and sentencing phases of a criminal proceeding. Lipsky, 
656 P.2d at 1247-48. 
The sentencing philosophy of the criminal law is that 
the punishment should not only fit the crime but the 
defendant as well. It is essential that fairness in 
sentencing both be perceived as such by the public and 
the defendant and, in fact, be fair. The information 
about the defendant must be accurate if society and the 
individual are to be properly served. 
Id. at 1248-49. 
In State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1005, the Utah Supreme 
Court considered whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(2) violated the 
fairness doctrine of the due process clause during sentencing 
proceedings. The statute stated in relevant part the following: 
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"Prior to imposition of any sentence . . . the court may . . . 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable 
period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence report 
on the defendant . . . . The court may disclose all or parts of 
the report to the defendant or his counsel as the interest of 
justice requires." Id. at 1007 (emphasis added). Although 
Section 77-18-1(2) appeared to be in conflict with Lipsky by 
making full disclosure and fairness optional rather than 
compulsory, the court squared it with constitutional mandates by 
stating that the seemingly subjective standard was not intended 
to be applied at the whim of a judge. 
[Rather, u]nder that standard, it is the exceptional 
case where full disclosure is not justified. Only when 
disclosure of the presentence report would jeopardize 
the life or safety of third parties, should there be 
deletions from the report to protect them. In such 
cases, disclosure to a defendant of as much of the 
report as possible should be made. Identifying indicia 
of a person who would be threatened should be excluded 
from the report, sealed, and included in the report on 
appeal. In all other cases, full disclosure of the 
report should be made. 
Id. at 1008. 
In connection with ruling that fairness and full disclosure 
is required in sentencing proceedings, the Casarez and Lipsky 
courts looked to the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 87 S.Ct. 1209 
(1967). In that case, petitioner was convicted under Colorado's 
criminal laws of committing a sex offense, and then sentenced 
under the Sex Offenders Act (the "Act"), a separate law. The Act 
authorized trial courts to order examinations of criminal 
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defendants, to receive reports relating to the examinations, and 
to use the reports in determining whether a criminal defendant 
constituted a "threat of bodily harm or was an habitual offender 
and mentally ill." IcL. 386 U.S. at 608. 
The Act made the "conviction the basis for commencing" the 
separate sentencing proceeding. Id. Once the trial court made 
its determination under the Act, it could sentence the criminal 
defendant to an indeterminate term of from one day to life. The 
petitioner was afforded "no hearing in the normal sense, no right 
of confrontation and so on" in connection with the sentencing 
proceeding. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court held that the Act was 
deficient in due process, including the right to counsel and to 
confront witnesses, as measured by the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In its ruling, the Court considered a 
comparable Pennsylvania statute: 
It is a separate criminal proceeding which may be 
invoked after conviction of one of the specified 
crimes. Petitioner therefore was entitled to a full 
judicial hearing before the magnified sentence was 
imposed. At such a hearing the requirements of due 
process cannot be satisfied by partial or niggardly 
procedural protections. A defendant in such a 
proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the 
relevant protections which due process guarantees in 
state criminal proceedings. He must be afforded all 
those safeguards which are fundamental rights and 
essential to a fair trial, including the right to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. 
Id. 386 U.S. at 609-10 (quoting Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 
302, 312 (3rd Cir. 1966)). 
Although Specht does not specifically recognize a criminal 
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defendant's right to a preliminary hearing, the presumption of 
innocence until each element is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and a jury in connection with new elements raised in sentencing 
proceedings, this Court should interpret Article I, section 7 as 
protecting such interests, particularly where the additional 
elements concern the criminal defendant's culpable mental state. 
See Argument, Point I.B.I., supra. Such an interpretation would 
be consistent with the concerns raised in Lipsky and Casarez, and 
would be appropriate since Utah courts recognize greater 
protections under the Utah due process provision than are 
afforded under the federal provision. 
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), 
the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the interests guaranteed 
by the Utah due process provision are more expansive than those 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, the court 
rejected the United States Supreme Court's determination that 
parole is not a liberty interest protected under a constitutional 
due process analysis: "[T]he reasoning of [the United States 
Supreme Court in] Greenholt has little persuasive force when 
addressing a due process claim under the Utah Constitution in the 
context of our indeterminate sentencing scheme." Id. at 734. 
In recognizing that the Utah Declaration of Rights is more 
far-reaching in its protections than is the federal Bill of 
Rights, the Utah Supreme Court also stated the following: 
[T]he mandate of the due process clause of article I, 
section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah 
Constitution is comprehensive in its application to all 
activities of state government. It is the province of 
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the judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of 
due process by an arm of government be heard and, if 
justified, that it be vindicated. 
Id. at 735 
According to Foote, the Utah Constitution requires that due 
process protections be afforded when "the actual number of years 
a defendant is to serve" is determined. Id. at 735. Because the 
gang enhancement statute introduces new elements to be proved, 
and mandates that a criminal defendant serve an enhanced sentence 
of a specific number of years if he is found to be in violation 
of that statute, the full panoply of due process protections must 
be extended to the criminal defendant. The Oregon courts7 
approach should serve as a guide to the Utah approach. See 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1247. The courts in that jurisdiction have 
assured protections under state constitutional provisions in 
connection with schemes and statutes that are strikingly similar 
to Section 76-3-203.1. 
In State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982), the Oregon 
Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of a 
sentencing enhancement statute. In that case, a jury convicted 
the defendant of committing first degree robbery with two other 
individuals, but made no finding with respect to whether the 
defendant used a firearm in the commission of the crime. At the 
sentencing proceeding, the trial court found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Wedge used or threatened to use a firearm and enhanced 
Wedge's sentence. In reversing the conviction and ruling that 
the statute was unconstitutional, the Oregon court stated: 
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Although the challenged statute is denominated an 
enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new 
crime. The jury only considered evidence offered on 
the question of first degree robbery, and convicted him 
of that offense, but the defendant was sentenced on the 
basis of having been found guilty of the crime of 
"first degree robbery using a firearm." If the 
legislature had actually described the crime as "first 
degree robbery using a firearm" the use of a firearm 
would certainly be an element and there would be no 
doubt defendant would have a right to a jury 
determination of guilt. The legislature cannot 
eliminate constitutional protections by separating and 
relabeling elements of a crime. 
Id. at 778; see also State v. Ouinn, 623 P.2d 630, 642-43 (Or. 
1981); State v. Mitchell, 734 P.2d 379, 382 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). 
The fundamental principles set forth in Specht, Wedge, and 
Ouinn are consistent with the concerns raised by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Lipsky and Casarez. A criminal defendant is entitled to 
procedural due process protections during the sentencing phase, 
particularly where additional elements, including the criminal 
defendant's mental culpability, will be considered by the fact 
finder in order to impose an enhanced sentence. 
Because Section 76-3-203.1 mandates a criminal defendant to 
serve an enhanced sentence for engaging in conduct in concert 
with others, the criminal defendant is entitled to a preliminary 
hearing and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury on the 
matter. "[T]he extent of punishment is to be determined 
according to the existence of the proscribed fact," e.g., "in 
concert" conduct. "[I]t must be proved at trial" to a jury. 
Wedge, 860 P.2d at 132. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 is deficient 
for failing to provide the full panoply of due process 
guarantees. For that reason, it is unconstitutional. 
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POINT IV. SECTION 76-3-203.1 VIOLATES THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE 
UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
"all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." It 
embodies the same general principle against discrimination as the 
Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution: "persons 
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in 
different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 
(Utah 1984); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 
85 S.Ct. 283 (1964). 
Whether a statute discriminates against a class of persons 
in violation of the Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the 
Utah Constitution or the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution depends on the effect of the statute and its 
objectives. Under both the Utah and the federal scheme, if the 
statute deals with particularly sensitive constitutional values 
or discriminates based on suspect classifications, the court will 
apply a heightened scrutiny of legislative means and ends, 
involving a real and thoughtful examination of legislative 
purpose and the relationship between the legislation and that 
purpose. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989) (strict scrutiny test is used 
if a challenged classification is "suspect" or if a "fundamental 
interest" is involved); Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 
P.2d 348, 356, 358 (Utah 1989). 
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The Utah and the federal schemes diverge, however, if a 
fundamental right or a suspect class is not affected by the 
statutory classification. Under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution, the analysis has been articulated 
as follows: "a statutory classification is constitutional unless 
it has no rational relationship to a legislatively stated purpose 
or, if not stated, to any reasonably conceivable legislative 
purpose." Lee, 867 P.2d at 580 (emphasis added). 
With respect to the analysis under the Utah provision, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Although [Article I, section 24] is sometimes thought 
to have the same effect and impose the same legal 
standards on legislative action as the equal protection 
guarantee found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, the language and history of 
the two provisions are entirely different, and even 
though there are important areas of overlap in the 
concepts embodied in the two provisions, the 
differences can produce different legal consequences. 
As stated in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 
1984), "The different language of Article I, § 24, the 
different constitutional contexts of the two 
provisions, and different jurisprudential 
considerations may lead to a different result in 
applying equal protection principles under Article I, § 
24 than might be reached under federal law." 
Lee, 867 P.2d at 577. 
To that end, Utah courts apply the following standard if a 
fundamental right or a suspect class is not affected by the 
classification: "First, a law must apply equally to all persons 
within a class" and " [s]econd, the statutory classifications and 
the different treatment given the classes must be based on 
differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute. If the relationship of the 
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classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable or 
fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable." Malan, 693 P.2d 
at 670 (emphasis added; citations omitted); Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 
1988); see also State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 467 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) . 
Since the Utah "reasonable tendency" standard is more 
rigorous than and will always meet or exceed the federal 
"rational basis" standard, Utah courts should review a statute 
under the Utah "reasonable tendency" standard when applicable. 
Lee, 867 P.2d at 582 n. 15; Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 
890; Pharris, 846 P.2d at 467. 
As set forth below, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 affects 
fundamental rights embodied in the state and federal 
constitutions. Therefore, a strict scrutiny standard applies. 
In the event the Court is reluctant to apply the strict scrutiny 
standard, the statute must be stricken under the "reasonable 
tendency" standard for violating Article I, section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
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A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 INTERFERES WITH 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, THEREBY REQUIRING APPLICATION OF 
THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD. 
1. Section 76-3-203.1 Creates a Sub-Class of Criminal 
Defendants Stripped of Certain Fundamental Rights. 
Section 76-3-203.1 creates a sub-class of defendants 
(accused of rape, homicide, burglary, larceny, etc.) that is 
separated in the following manner from other defendants accused 
of the same criminal conduct: After a determination of guilt on 
the original offense of rape, homicide, burglary, larceny, etc., 
the members of the sub-class are subjected to a separate 
proceeding to determine whether they should be penalized for 
associating with others. See Point II.C, supra. Because the 
sub-class is not entitled to a preliminary hearing in connection 
with a Section 76-3-203.1 proceeding, and the state is not 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that the 
members of the sub-class associated with others in connection 
with criminal conduct, the lack of constitutional safeguards 
ensnares and penalizes defendants merely for associating with 
others. 
A person is guaranteed the right to associate with others 
under the First Amendment to the federal constitution. See 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 1498, 
78 S.Ct. 1163 (1958) (recognizing that freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is "an 
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of 
speech"). Because Section 76-3-203.1 interferes in its 
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application with a particularly sensitive First Amendment value, 
the legislation must be closely scrutinized to determine whether 
it is necessary to a compelling state interest. See Harper v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 16 L.Ed.2d 
169, 86 S.Ct. 1079 (1966); San Antonio Independent School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973). 
2. The Interests Relating to the Enactment of the 
Statute Are, First, the Elimination of Gang-Related 
Crime and. Second, the Conservation of Resources. 
The Utah legislature seeks to impose an enhanced penalty 
against defendants for associating with others in order to send a 
message to organized gang members that criminal activity is not 
welcomed in Utah. See Argument, Point I.A.I., supra. While the 
elimination of gang-related crime is certainly a valid state 
interest, penalizing all defendants for associating with others 
is not necessary to achieving that interest. Section 76-3-203.1 
has the effect of penalizing defendants for mere association 
since the statute does not require proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt to a jury of criminal culpability. 
In addition, according to the legislative history of Section 
76-3-203.1, legislators expected and intended that the statute 
would be applied in an economical manner. Hence, the statute 
eliminates the time consuming process of a preliminary hearing, 
assembling a jury to hear the evidence, and presenting the 
evidence in order to prove a violation of the statute beyond a 
reasonable doubt. While the conservation of resources appears to 
be another "state interest," its interference with a 
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constitutional right cannot be justified unless the state can 
show that conserving resources is "urgently and overwhelmingly 
necessary." Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 363 
(Utah 1989). Since the state cannot make such a showing, the 
statute is unconstitutional. 
B. THE CLASSIFICATIONS CREATED BY SECTION 76-3-203.1 
ARE NOT BASED ON DIFFERENCES THAT HAVE A REASONABLE 
TENDENCY TO FURTHER THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STATUTE. 
Even if the "strict scrutiny" analysis is not applicable to 
Section 76-3-203.1, the statute is unconstitutional under Utah's 
"reasonable tendency" standard. The first prong of the Utah 
analysis requires laws to apply equally to all persons within a 
class. As set forth in Point IV.A.1., supra, Section 76-3-203.1 
fails that prong, because it creates a sub-class of defendants 
subjected to an enhanced sentence for associating with others. 
Since the enhanced sentencing scheme fails the first prong, in 
order to be valid under the Utah standard, it must have a 
"reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute." 
Malan, 693 P.2d at 670 (emphasis added). As set forth above, the 
primary objective of Section 76-3-203.1 is to get ganglords off 
the streets. 
However, gang-related activity is not addressed in the 
statute, nor are the most traditional notions of "gangs." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995). The California Act describes 
a "criminal street gang" as follows: 
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[A]ny ongoing organization, association, or group of 
three or more persons, whether formal or informal, 
having as one of its primary activities the commission 
of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in [the 
Act], having a common name or common identifying sign 
or symbol, and whose members individually or 
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity. 
Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(f) (West). Utah legislators describe a 
gang as a group of youth with common signs or signals. See 
Argument, Point I.A.I., supra. Those characteristics are not 
identified in the statute. 
If the gang enhancement statute tends to eliminate gang-
related crimes, the tendency is muddied and obscured by the broad 
language of the statute and is more "fanciful than real." Malan, 
693 P.2d at 673. In reality, the reasonable tendency of the 
statute is to enhance the criminal sentence of those persons who 
have no gang relations or to enhance the sentence of the gang 
follower, those members of the gang who are easily influenced or 
led by the ganglord, thereby casting doubt on what the 
legislature actually intended to do. The classification must 
rest on some difference which "'bears a reasonable and just 
relation to the act in respect to which the classification is 
proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such 
basis." Malan, 693 P.2d at 671 (quoting Gulf, Colorado & Santa 
Fe Railway v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159, 17 S. Ct. 255, 258, 41 
L.Ed. 666 (1897)). Because there is no rational relationship 
between the objective of locking up ganglords and a statute that 
enhances the sentences of persons who have no gang relations, 
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Section 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional under the "rational 
tendency" analysis. 
REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED AND OPINION 
ISSUED. 
Application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 raises important 
federal and state constitutional questions of first impression. 
As set forth above, the statute requires evidence of the criminal 
defendant's culpable mental state, thereby entitling a criminal 
defendant to a preliminary hearing, to the presumption of 
innocence until each element of the statute is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and to a jury. 
Because the Utah legislature has carved out those rights in 
connection with a determination that the defendant violated 
Section 76-3-203.1, the statute violates specific state 
constitutional provisions, the state and federal due process 
clauses, the state uniform operation of the laws provision and 
the federal equal protection provision. Oral argument and a 
published opinion would remind prosecutors and trial courts of 
the reach of important constitutional provisions, and would send 
a message to them to discontinue application of the statute so 
long as it violates fundamental rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Cheeney respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
enhanced penalty imposed against him on the basis that Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 violates the federal and state constitutions in 
the following manners: Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 violates 
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Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution by interfering 
with a criminal defendant's right to a preliminary hearing in 
connection with a proceeding to determine whether the statute has 
been violated; it violates Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution by carving out a criminal defendant's right to a 
jury in a proceeding to determine whether the statute has been 
violated; it violates a criminal defendant's fundamental right to 
the presumption of innocence until each element of the statute is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; it is void for vagueness in 
violation of the federal due process provision; it violates the 
state due process provision; it violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the federal constitution; and it violates the Uniform 
Operation of Laws provision of the Utah Constitution. 
SUBMITTED this /^ fet day of February, 1996. 
LINDA M. JONES J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
REBECCA HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
G^Wrh<W^ CW^PVQA 
4 ^ 5* 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. . 
Count No. 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter _ 
Bailiff 
Date 
(COMMITMENT) 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted 0 denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having 
D plea of no contesfrof the offense of 
ofthP y ^ p g r ^ t f ^ f f a ftlass^ misrtemgannr,v 
represented hy( ^ . V\v!u3sfl-^ apd the State being represented by ^ L * TSrVyVL^is now adjudged guilty 
of the above^oWise, isjTfly^-serttenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
been convicted by D a jury; D the court; )*f plea of guilty; 
& t i ? < A f t ? \ k _ _ , a felony 
e orSoeing hqy/ present in court and ready for sentence and 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
^ n o t to exceed five years; ^>\cf_ ^ v \ ^ < i r \ N ^ C C - ^ ^ \ ^ ( ^ & - WtCrfL. 'Si.j 
D of not less than one year nor more "than fifteen years; ^ \ 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
O and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; ** »
 v 
^ a n d ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to \ f tCf t t to A 9 ? T ^ ; ^ " ^ * » **>!<£ T V \ Q i y ^AgraAar IT? 
Ccot* *2L 
pV-Vcy *V iW5> t » i fe«\)^g 
such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with
 v ^ _ 
upon motion o f X S t a t e » D Defense, D Court, rn i i n t ( s )3 -3 ^ fl.ft*&^*\bb%J\bvft* hereby dismissed 
G Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
}sf Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
XCommitment shall issue ATi 
DATED this _i£l i^9ay of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page 0 .JL 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR COMMISSION OF CRIME IN CONCERT 
WITH TWO OR MORS PERSONS 
STATS OF UTAH, 
Pla in t i f f , CASE NO. qg\QOUi»Qq FS 
VS. COUNT NO. __} 
Defendant. % 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 76-3-203.1, the Court 
finds the defendant having been adjudged guilty is subject to an 
enhanced penalty as provided in that section in that the defendant 
committed said offense in concert with two or more persons. 
Therefore, it is ordered that the defendant be confined and 
imprisoned at the /\ Utah State Prison, or Salt Lake County 
Jail, to an enhanced minimum term as provided by law of: 
90 days 
180 days 
X. 3 years 
6 years 
9 years 
20 years 
•Such sentence shall run consecutively and not concurrently vith 
the basic sentence set forth in the original Commitment and 
n. J f c of fo/~ is$£ Dated t h i s 
Page ^ o f H 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
vs. 
^vS^Vr^Tx£5? OrvULENE-O 5 
Defendant. 
Case No. . 
Count No. 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter _ 
Bailiff 
Date 
ft.. ?wMlx> 
A. ryre 
9. ftftt^Vv 
/V*. ary w r 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted a denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having beqn convicted by a a jury; 0 the court; V plea of guilty; 
O plea of no contest; of the offense of *T^<L^rV»
 a felony 
of the egree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by V M V \ U A & - - , and the State being represented by ^ . T T N M <^ j S now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is noV sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; \ 
^ o f not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; ^C^> Q ^ ^ r Q ^ V . ^ v C i l ^ r ^ ^ X L v ^ ~ 9 ^ $ * ~ ^ J 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; ^ ^ * v ^ ' 
O not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of * . 
} t f and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to (*-_£& ( V > O N \ ^ \ J
 m 
^ such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon 
Pf**fr *\ 
t  i  TO r  ti l  itn r W o r ^ g OA g * r*:c *** ^ \ ^ v c* c ^ * ^ < r u " ± 
motion o f ^S ta te . Q Defense. D Court. Count (s)3-3 ^ C * e * * \ t f t f l * f e & Vmmhy d ismiss^ 
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
* V Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake CountyJ^for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison. Draper. Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
X Commitment shall issue 
DATED this pLi^Tday of 
/ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
,DISTEt£f COURT JUDGE 
/ 
Deputy County Attorney Page 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR COMMISSION OF CRIME IN CONCERT 
WITH TWO OR MORS PERSONS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASE NO. qSWOUoQq FS 
COUNT NO. ^ 
(^gJtoWs* CV\eAX\i 
T 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 76-3-203.1, the Court 
finds the defendant having been adjudged guilty is subject to an 
enhanced penalty as provided in that section in that the defendant 
committed said offense in concert with two or more persons. 
Therefore, it is ordered that the defendant be confined and 
imprisoned at the X Utah State Prison, or Salt Lake County 
Jail, to an enhanced minimum term as provided by law of: 
90 days 
180 days 
• • 3 years 
X 6 years 
9 years 
20 years 
*Such sentence shall run consecutively and not concurrently with 
the basic sentence set forth in the original Commitment and 
Judgment. . 
Dated tiiis_j/M^Y of 
Page^LofjL 
ADDENDUM B 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — -jciiemeni 01 wie 
offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until 
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense* mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct pro-
scribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense 
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mentai state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert 
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, 
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or 
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice 
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subse-
quently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, 
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses underjntlejfe^Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except iSections 
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-
6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title 
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety 
Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, 
questions of fact by the jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as 
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prose-
cuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, 
unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the 
State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. 
The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
ADDENDUM C 
Chapter 11 
STREET TERRORISM ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION ACT 
Section 
186.20. 
186.21. 
186.22. 
186.22a. 
Citation. 
Legislative findings and declaration. 
Participation in criminal street gang; 
punishment; felony conviction; sen-
tence enhancement; commission on or 
near school grounds; pattern of crimi-
nal gang activity. 
Buildings or places used by criminal 
street gangs; nuisance; additional 
remedies; confiscation of firearms or 
Section 
186.23. 
186.24. 
186.25. 
18626. 
18627. 
186.28. 
deadly or dangerous weapons owned 
or possessed by gang members. 
Mutual aid activities; labor organiza-
tions. 
Severability. 
Local laws; preemption. 
Criminal street gang; violent coercion to 
participate; offense. 
Duration of chapter. 
Firearms; supply, sell or give posses-
sion; participation in criminal street 
gangs. 
Chapter 11 mas added by Stats.1988, c 12tf, § 1, eff Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, 
eff. Sept 26, 1988. 
Repeal 
Chapter 11 is repealed Jan. 1, 1997, by the provisions of § 186.27. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Gang evidence: Issues for criminal defense. Susan L. 
Burrell, 30 Santa Clara L.Rev. 739 (1990). 
§ 186.20. Citation 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act." 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.) 
Additions or changes indicated by underline; deletions by asterisks * * * 
80 
PENAL CODE §186.22 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Section 5 of Stats.1988, c 1256, provides: 
*On or before January 1, 1991, the District Attorney of 
Los Angeles County and the City Attorney of the City of 
Los Angeles shall submit a report to the Legislature on 
the effect of this act on the control of criminal street gang 
activity in the County of Los Angeles. The report shall 
include, but need not be limited to, all of the following: 
"(a) The number of arrests under this act 
"(b) The number of prosecutions under this act 
5 186.21. Legislative findings and declaration 
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it is the right of every person, regardless of race, color, 
creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, sexual orientation, or handicap, to be secure and protected from 
fear, intimidation, and physical harm caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals. It is not 
the intent of this chapter to interfere with the exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of freedom 
of expression and association. The Legislature hereby recognizes the constitutional right of every citizen 
to harbor and express beliefs on any lawful subject whatsoever, to lawfully associate with others who 
share similar beliefs, to petition lawfully constituted authority for a redress of perceived grievances, and 
to participate in the electoral process. 
The Legislature, however, further finds that the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been 
caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes 
against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively, 
present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected. The 
Legislature finds that there are nearly 600 criminal street gangs operating in California, and that the 
number of gang-related murders is increasing. The Legislature also finds that in Los Angeles County 
alone there were 328 gang-related murders in 1986, and that gang homicides in 1987 have increased 80 
percent over 1986. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of 
criminal activity by street gangs by focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the 
organized nature of street gangs, which together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs. 
The Legislature further finds that an effective means of punishing and deterring the criminal activities of 
street gangs is through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or 
used by street gangs. 
(Added by State.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1266, § 1, efif. Sept 26, 1988.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
§ 9605. 
§ 1P6.22. Participation in criminal street gang; punishment; felony conviction; sentence en-
hancement; commission on or near school grounds; pattern of criminal gang activity 
(a) Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members 
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or 
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or 
2 or 3 years. 
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (4), any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to 
promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, 
in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he 
or she has been convicted, be punished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at the court's 
discretion * * *. 
(2) If the underlying felony described in paragraph (1) is committed on the grounds of, or within 1,000 
feet of, a public or private elementary, vocational, junior high, or high school, during hours in which the 
facility is open for classes or school related programs or when minors are using the facility, the additional 
term shall be two, three, or four years, at the court's discretion. * * * 
u(c) The number of trials which have resulted from 
prosecutions under this act, and the number of pleas 
which resulted. 
"(d) Tlie number of convictions under this act 
"(e) The number and type of sentence enhancements 
which have been sought under this act, and the number 
and kind which have been ordered by the courts. 
u(f) The number of nuisance abatement actions under 
this act" 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
} 9606. 
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(3) The court shall order the imposition of the middle term of the sentence enhancement, unless there 
are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. The court shall state the reasons for its choice of 
sentence enhancements on the record at the time of the sentencing. 
(4) Any person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by imprisonment 
in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served. 
(c) If the court grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence imposed upon the defendant for 
a violation of subdivision (a), or in cases involving a true finding of the enhancement enumerated in 
subdivision (b), the court shall require that the defendant serve a minimum of 180 days in a county jail as 
a condition thereof. 
(d) Notwithstanding any other law, the court may strike the additional punishment for the enhance-
ments provided in this section or refuse to impose the minimum jafl sentence for misdemeanors in an 
unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served, if the court specifies on the record and 
enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best be served by 
that disposition. 
(e) As used in this chapter, "pattern of criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted 
commission, or solicitation of two or more of the foflowing offenses, provided at least one of those offenses 
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those offenses occurred within three years 
after a prior offense, and the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons: 
(1) Assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, as defined 
in Section 245. 
(2) Robbery, as defined in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 211) of Title 8 of Part 1. 
(3) Unlawful homicide or manslaughter, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 187) of Title 
8 of Part 1. 
(4) The sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture 
controlled substances as defined in Sections 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, and 11058 of the Health and 
Safety Code. 
(5) Shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle, as defined in Section 246. 
(6) Discharging or permitting the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle, as defined in 
subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 12034. 
(7) Arson, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 450) of Title 13. 
(8) The intimidation of witnesses and victims, as defined in Section 136.1. 
(9) Grand theft, as defined in Section 487, when the value of the money, labor, or real or personal 
property taken exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000). 
(10) Grand theft of any vehicle, trailer, or vessel, as described in Section 487h. 
(11) Burglary, as defined in Section 459. 
(12) Rape, as defined in Section 261. 
(13) Looting, as defined in Section 463. 
(14) Moneylaundering, as defined in Section 186.10. 
(15) Kidnapping, as defined in Section 207. 
(16) Mayhem, as defined in Section 203. 
(17) Aggravated mayhem, as defined in Section 205. 
(18) Torture, as defined in Section 206. 
(19) Felony extortion, as defined in Sections 518 and 520. 
(20) Felony vandalism, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 594. 
(21) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215. 
(22) The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm as described in Section 12072. 
(23) Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person in 
violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 12101. 
(f) As used in this chapter, "criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, association, or 
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the 
commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (23), inclusive, of 
Additions or chanaes indicated hv underline: deletions bv asterisks * * * 
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subdivision (e), having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members 
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. 
(g) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and on that date is repealed. 
(Added by Stats.1989, c. 930, § 5.1, operative Jan. 1, 1993. Amended by Stats.1991, c. 201 (AB.1135), 
§ 1, operative Jan. 1, 1993; Stats.1991, c. 661 (A.B.1866), § 2, operative Jan. 1, 1993; Stats.1993, c. 601 
(S.B.724), § 1; Stats.1993, c. 610 (AB.6), § 3, eff. Oct 1,1993; Stats.1993, c. 611 (S.B.60), § 3, eff. Oct 1, 
1993; Statl993, c. 1125 (AB.1630), § 3; Stats.1994, c. 47 (S.B.480), § 1, eff. April 19,1994; Stats.1994, c 
451 (A.B.2470), § 1; Stats.1995, c. 377 (S.B.1095), § 2.) 
Repeal 
Section 186.22 is repealed by its own terms on Jan 1, 1997. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1989 Legislation 
Section 12.5 of Stats.1989, c. 930 provides: 
"Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 8.1, 9.1, and 11.1 of this act shall 
become operative on January 1, 1993, unless a later 
enacted statute, which is enacted before January 1, 1993, 
changes that date." 
1991 Legislation 
The 1991 amendment inserted the provision relating to 
the additional term imposed when the underlying felony is 
committed on the grounds of or within 1,000 feet of 
certain schools; and added provisions relating to the 
operative date and the repeal of the section. 
Effect of amendment of section by two or more acts at 
the same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
$ 9606. 
1992 Legislation 
Former § 186.22, added by Stato.1988, c 1242, $ 1; 
Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, amended by Stats.1989, c 144, 
§ 1; Stats.1989, c. 930, § 5; Stats.1991, c 661 (AB.1866), 
§ 1, relating to similar subject matter, was repealed by its 
own terms effective Jan. 1, 1993. 
1993 Legislation 
The 1993 amendment by c 611 inserted subd (eX8) 
relating to carjacking. 
Section affected by two or more acts at the same 
session of the legislature, see Government Code § 9605. 
Amendments of this section by §§ 3.02, 3.06, 3.08, 3.09, 
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 of Stats. 
1993, c. 611, failed to become operative under the provi-
sions of § 41 of that Act 
Amendments of this section by §§ 3.02, 3.06, 3.08, 3.09, 
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 of Stats. 
1993 c. 610, failed to become operative under the provi-
sions of § 36 of that Act 
The 1993 amendment by c 1125 added subd. (eX8) 
relating to grand theft of a vehicle; deleted former subd. 
(e)(8), which read "Carjacking, as defined in Section 215"; 
deleted subd (g) which provided an operative date of Jan. 
1, 1993; redesignated as subd. (g) former subd. (h); in 
subd. (g), deleted "unless a later enacted statute which is 
enacted before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends that 
date"; and made other nonsubstantive changes. 
1994 Legislation 
The 1994 amendment, by c. 47, in subd. (a), substituted 
"16 months, or 2 or 3 years" for "one, two, or three 
years"; in subd. (b)(1), deleted "which is" Mowing "who 
Firearm possession during street gang crimes, sentence 
enhancement, see Penal Code § 12021.5. 
is convicted of a felony"; rewrote subd. (c); in subd. (d), 
deleted "provision or following "Notwithstanding any oth-
er"; in subd. (e), redesignated as pars. (7) and (8) former 
pars. (6) and (7), inserted par. (6) relating to discharge of 
a firearm from a motor vehicle, redesignated as par. (10) 
former par. (8), and inserted pars. (9) and (11) to (21) 
relating, respectively, to grand theft exceeding $10,000, 
burglary, rape, looting, money laundering, kidnapping, 
mayhem, aggravated mayhem, torture, felony extortion, 
felony vandalism and carjacking; and in subd. (f), substi-
tuted "(21)" for "(8)", substituted "having" for "which has" 
following "subdivision (e)" and inserted "and" following 
"symbol,". Prior to amendment, subd. (c) read: 
"(c) Any person who is convicted of a public offense 
punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor, which is com-
mitted for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in associa-
tion with, any criminal street gang, with the specific intent 
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by 
gang members, shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
county jafl not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in 
the state prison for one, two, or three years, provided that 
any person sentenced to imprisonment in a county jafl 
shall be imprisoned for a period not to exceed one year, 
but not less than 180 days, and shall not be eligible for 
release upon completion of sentence, parole, or any other 
basis, until he or she has served 180 dayB. If the court 
grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence 
imposed upon the defendant, it shall require as a condition 
thereof that the defenaant serve 180 days in a county 
jafl." 
The 1994 amendment by c. 451 added subd. (eX22) 
relating to sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm; and 
added subd. (eX23) relating to possession. 
The 1994 amendment of this section by c. 451 (A.B.2470) 
explicitly amended the 1994 amendment of this section by 
c 47 (S.B.480). 
Section 17 of Stats.1994, c 451 (A.B.2470), provides: 
"This bill shall become operative only if Assembly BiD 
2428 of the 1993-94 Regular Session of the Legislature 
(Stats.1994, c. 454] is chaptered and becomes effective on 
or before January 1, 1995." 
1995 Legislation 
The 1995 amendment, in subd (b)(1), substituted "para-
graph (4)" for "paragraph (2)"; in subd. (b), inserted 
paragraph designations (2) and (3); in subd. (b)(2), insert-
ed "described in paragraph (1)" following "felony"; redes-
ignated as subd. (bX4) former subd. (bX2); and made 
nonsubstantive changes throughout 
Juvenile court rules related to this section, see Califor-
nia Rules of Court, rule 1404. 
Cross References 
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Code of Regulations References 
Gang, definition, see 15 CaL Code of Regs. § 3000. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Review of selected 1989 California legislation. 21 Pac. 
LJ. 425 (1990). 
Review of selected 1993 California legislation. 25 Pac 
LJ. 513 (1994). 
Review of selected 1994 California legislation. 26 Pac. 
LJ. 202 (1995). 
Library References 
California Jury Instructions-Criminal [CALJIC]. 
United States Supreme Court 
Death penalty, admissibility of evidence, gang member-
ship, freedom of association, see Dawson v. Delaware, 
1992,112 S.Ct 1093,117 L.Ed.2d 309, on remand 608 A^d 
1201, appeal after remand 637 AAi 57. 
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Validity 1 
L Validity 
"Benefit" as used in statute providing for sentence 
enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal 
street gang member where felony is for benefit of street 
gang was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when 
term was read in conjunction with statute's qualifying 
language so as to limit scope to only those acts committed 
with specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any 
criminal conduct by gang members. In re Alberto R. 
(App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 Cal.App.3d 
1309. 
Phrase "and the last of those offenses occurred within 
three years after a prior offense," which was part of 
definition of "pattern of criminal gang activity" contained 
in Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, was 
not unconstitutionaDy vague or overbroad, despite defen-
dant's anticipated scenarios in which gang members could 
be charged for crimes in future of which they had no 
knowledge and in which they did not participate. In re 
Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 CaLRptr.2d 348, 236 
CaLApp.3d 1309. 
"Primary activities" as used in statutory definition of 
"criminal street gang" whose members could receive sen-
tence enhancement if convicted of felony as member was 
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad despite conten-
tion that enforcement would be arbitrary based on who 
made decision of what gang's primary activities were; 
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, of 
which phrase was part, specifically listed felonious conduct 
required to invoke its provisions. In re Alberto R. (App. 
4 Dist 1991) 1 CaLRpti\2d 348, 236 CaLApp.3d 1309. 
"Promote, further, or assist" as used in statute provid-
ing for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of 
felony as criminal street gang member was not unconsti-
tutionally vague or overbroad inasmuch as phrase had 
been consistently used by courts to describe aiding and 
abetting. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 CaL 
Rptr^d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309. 
Statute making it offense to actively participate in 
criminal street gang activity and providing for sentence 
enhancement based on that activity is not unconstitution-
ally overbroad In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 
CaLRptr^d 348, 236 CaLApp^d 1309. 
Statute providing for sentence enhancement for defen-
dant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member 
did not violate equal protection despite defendant's char-
acterization of enhancement as being similar to crime of 
conspiracy, which included procedural safeguards that 
enhancement did not; conspiracy required agreement 
with others to commit offense, while enhancement statute 
required active participation in felonious criminal gang 
activity, and defendant subject to enhancement was not 
similarly situated to defendant charged with conspiracy. 
In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 
CaLApp.3d 1309. 
Statutory provision pursuant to which defendant con-
victed of felony as criminal street gang member was 
subject to sentence enhancement if felony was convicted 
with "specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any 
criminal conduct by gang members" provided adequate 
notice of what conduct was proscribed and was not uncon-
stitutionaDy vague. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 
Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 Cal.App.3d 1309. 
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act and 
its provision for sentence enhancement for defendant con-
victed of felony as criminal street gang member did not 
vest unfettered discretion; Act specifically designated 
crimes in which gang had to be involved In re Alberto R. 
(App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 Cal.App.3d 
1309. 
When narrowly construed to pertain only to conduct 
that was purely felonious, Le., punishable in state prison, 
phrase "felonious criminal conduct" as used in statute 
making it offense to promote, further, or assist such 
conduct by gang members was not unconstitutionally 
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vague or overbroad In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 
1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309. 
Sentence enhancement for "membership* in criminal 
street gang was not unconstitutionally vague. People v. 
Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 Cal. 
App.3d 967. 
Sentence enhancement provision for crimes committed 
in association with criminal street gang, with specific 
intent to promote, further or assist in mminal conduct of 
members of gang, did not violate due process, even though 
it did not require proof that defendant was aware of 
predicate offenses committed by other gang members. 
People v. Games (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894,235 
Cal.App.3d 957. 
Sentence enhancement provision for participation in 
"criminal street gang" was not unconstitutionally over-
broad; statute regulated criminal conduct, not speech or 
association, and there was no right of association to 
engage in mminal conduct People v. Gamez (App. 4 
Dist 1991) 286 Cal.Rptr. 894, 235 CaJApp.3d 957. 
Sentence enhancement provision for participation in 
"criminal street gang" was not unconstitutionally vague; 
statutory definition clarified that it was not mere associa-
tion with others, but rather association with others for 
purpose of committing crime, where association's very 
existence was founded upon commission of crime, that was 
prohibited People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 
CaLRptr. 894, 235 CaLApp.3d 957. 
Fact that terms of this section were not perfectly 
defined or may not have been defined precisely did not 
invalidate section under due process clause. People v. 
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL 
App.3d692. 
The term "criminal street gang," as used in this section 
was sufficiently defined and did not render section uncon-
stitutionally vague under due process clause; section did 
not make it criminal to be member of undefined "gang" 
but prohibited membership in criminal street gang which 
was defined as any ongoing organization, association, or 
group of three or more persons, whether formal or infor-
mal, having as one of its primary activities the commission 
of one or more enumerated criminal acts. People v. 
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL 
App.3d 692. 
The phrase "knowledge of pattern of criminal gang 
activity" was not unconstitutionally vague under due pro-
cess clause; term "knowledge" was often used in criminal 
law meaning awareness of particular facts proscribed in 
criminal statutes and "pattern of criminal gang activity" 
was defined in this section. People v. Green (App. 1 Dist 
199P 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaLApp.3d 692. 
The phrase '^rillfully promotes, furthers, or assists in 
any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang" 
was not unconstitutionally vague under due process 
clause; similarity of phrase with that employed in deter-
mining if person is aider and abettor indicated that phras-
es should be viewed as anonymous. People v. Green 
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, 227 CalApp.3d 692. 
Although phrase "felonious criminal conduct," had some 
uncertainty, it could be construed to cover only conduct 
which was clearly felonious, i.e., which amounted to com-
mission of offense punishable by imprisonment in state 
prison and, as so construed, this section was not unconsti-
tutionally vague under due process clause. People v. 
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, 227 CaL 
App.3d 692. 
1.5. Due process 
Due process requires pleading enhancement under this 
chapter and requires proof of each fact required In re 
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Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 
CaLApp.3d 990. 
1.8. In general 
Mere membership in street gang is not a crime. People 
ex reL Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 1996) 40 Cai.Rptr.2d 
589, 34 CaLApp.4th 136, review granted and opinion su-
perseded 43 CaLRpto\2d 680, 899 P.2d 66. 
2. Presumptions and burden of proof 
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when 
state is seeking mminal street gang sentence enhance-
ment it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove through 
competent evidence the elements of a criminal street gang 
as set out in the statute, including the offenses necessary 
to satisfy the pattern requirement People v. Gardeley 
(App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 136,30 CaLApp.4th 402, 
34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and opinion super-
seded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115. 
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when 
state is seeking criminal street gang sentence enhance-
ment, while a gang expert can give opinion as to whether 
predicate crime was act in furtherance of gang activities if 
such testimony on ultimate issue would assist trier of fact, 
if, as a basis for that opinion, expert is not relying on facts 
he had observed, or of which he had personal knowledge, 
or that were given to him as an assumption from evidence 
introduced in the case, his testimony can only be eKcited 
in the form of hypothetical question, and that opinion, in 
turn, stands or falls depending, initially, upon whether 
trier of fact finds assumed facts to be true or false from 
evidence introduced to establish existence of such facta. 
People v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 
30 Cal.App.4th 402, 34 CaLApp.4th 1614, review granted 
and opinion superseded 39 CaLRptr^d 406,890 P^d 1116. 
For mminal street gang sentence enhancement to be 
found true, there must be substantial evidence to support 
finding of existence of "criminal street gang" members 
engaged in "pattern of criminal gang activity." Matter of 
Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282 CaLRptr. 75, 230 CaL 
App.3d 1455, review denied 
Pattern of criminal gang activity used to support sen-
tence enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not 
require that the pattern of criminal street gang activity be 
shown by instances of purposeful gang activity. In re 
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 
Cal.App.3d 990. 
Enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not require 
proof of two different offenses rather than two instances 
of the same offense. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 
1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
3. Ongoing organization 
Element of "criminal street gang" for sentence en-
hancement pursuant to California Street Terrorism En-
forcement and Prevention Act that there be an ongoing 
organization of three or more persons was met by testimo-
ny of juvenile witnesses identifying at least three partici-
pants in particular incident as members of a street gang, 
testimony that there was a membership roll written on a 
wall, and that members, friends, and supporters of the 
group were capable of concerted action. In re Nathaniel 
C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 
990. 
3.5. Pattern of activity 
Pattern of criminal gang activity element of offense of 
participating in criminal street gang does not require 
proof of prior enumerated offense, but rather may be 
based on incident for which defendant is on trial People 
v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 
Cal.App.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review 
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granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptrJ2d 678, 899 
P.2d64. 
Single incident, even incident on which current prosecu-
tion is based, can provide factual basis to find pattern of 
criminal gang activity required to support conviction for 
participating in criminal street gang. People v. Loeun 
(App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 
1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review granted 
and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^ d 678, 899 P.2d 64. 
Evidence supported finding of pattern of criminal gang 
activity required to support defendant's conviction for 
participating in criminal street gang, based on predicate 
offenses of two separate assaults with deadly weapons by 
gang members; defendant hit victim with bat and another 
member of same gang hit victim numerous times with 
long, thin object People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 
Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, 
as modified, review granted and opinion superseded 43 
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 899 P.2d 64. 
Under "continuous course of conduct" exception to una-
nimity requirement, jurors did not have to unanimously 
agree on which two of several possible predicate offenses 
established that gang had engaged in pattern of criminal 
activity, and thus was "criminal street gang,* in order to 
find defendant guilty of knowingly participating in crimi-
nal street gang and to impose enhanced punishment based 
on finding that murder was committed in association with 
such gang; pertinent element of definition of criminal 
street gang, Le., organization whose members engage in 
"pattern of crimina) gang activity," contemplated continu-
ous course of conduct People v. Funes (App. 1 Dist 
1994) 28 CaLRptr .2d 758, 23 CaLApp.4th 1506, modified on 
denial of rehearing, review denied 
4. Primary activity 
Requirement for enhancement of sentence pursuant to 
this chapter that the primary activity of the street gang at 
issue be criminal activity is a proper subject of expert 
opinion. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 
CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
Testimony by police officer, qualified as an expert, that 
primary activity of all the gangs in his area was criminal 
and that one of the crimes they committed was assault 
with a deadly weapon was insufficient to show that partic-
ular gang whose conduct was at issue with respect to 
enhancement pursuant to this chapter had criminal activi-
ty as a primary activity; expert did not identify the gang 
as one of the gangs in his area and the list of crimes which 
he said gangs commit included only one of the eight 
offenses specified in the statute. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 
1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
Fozus of this chapter is narrower than general criminal 
conduct; evidence supporting enhancement pursuant to 
the Act must establish that a primary activity of the gang 
is one or more of listed offenses. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 
1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
5. Active participation 
Sentence enhancement provision for "active partic-
ipation" in criminal street gang was not unconstitutionally 
vague; to be convicted, defendant must have more than 
nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical relationship 
with gang, and person must devote aU, or substantial part 
of his time and efforts to aiminal street gang. People v. 
Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 Cal. 
App.3d 957. 
To be convicted of being active participant in street 
gang, defendant must have relationship with criminal 
street gang which is more than nominal, passive, inactive 
or purely technical, and defendant must devote all, or 
substantial part of his time and efforts to criminal street 
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gang. People v. Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 
140, 227 CaLAppAl 692. 
The terms "actively participate" and "membership" 
gang were not unconstitutionally vague under due process 
clause; term "member'* had ordinary meaning and had 
also been judicially defined to mean a person who bears 
relationship to organization that is not accidentaL artificial 
or unconsciously in appearance only and the phrase "ac-
tively participate," in context, had same meaning as "ac-
tive membership* as defined by case law. People v. 
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL 
App.3d 692. 
6. Common name or identifying symbol 
Association of multiple names with a gang satisfies 
requirement of this chapter that the gang have a common 
name or common identifying sign or symbol, as long as at 
least one name is common to the gang's members. In re 
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 
Cal.App.3d 990. 
Element of criminal street gang for sentence enhance-
ment purposes pursuant to California Street Terrorism 
Enforcement and Prevention Act that the organization 
have a common name or common identifying sign or 
symbol was met by evidence that its members were 
taiown by two names and that there was graffiti which 
signified the gang, although no particular color or clothing 
was associated with gang membership. In re Nathaniel 
C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 
990. 
7. Predicate offense 
"Pattern of criminal gang activity" cannot be estab-
lished for sentence enhancement purposes by use of predi-
cate crimes that occur after the crime for which the 
defendant is being tried. People v. Godinez (App. 2 Dist 
1993) 22 CaLRptr^d 164, 17 CaLApp.4th 1363, review 
denied 
For purposes of juvenile proceeding, robbery, murder, 
and attempted murder of rival gang member were crimes 
committed on "separate occasions" within meaning of 
criminal street gang sentence enhancement statute, since 
juvenile had reasonable opportunity to reflect on actions 
in eight hours between robbery and attempted murder. 
Matter of Jose T. (App. * Dist 1991) 282 CaLRptr. 75, 230 
Cal.App.3d 1455, review denied. 
For purpose of juvenile proceeding, robbery, murder 
and attempted murder which were committed by two or 
more persons constituted qualifying predicate offenses for 
imposition of street gang sentencing enhancement pursu-
ant to requirement that predicate offenses must have been 
committed on separate occasions or by two or more 
persons. Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282 
CaLRptr. 75, 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, review denied. 
If there had been competent proof that one member of 
gang had shot another, that would have sufficed to show a 
predicate offense for a pattern of criminal gang activity 
under the enhancement provisions of this chapter; this 
section does not exempt from its scope those predicate 
offenses committed by gang members as part of internal 
gang disputes or power struggles. In re Nathaniel C. 
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CalApp.3d 990. 
Enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not require 
that each predicate offense be committed by two or more 
persons; it requires only that the offenses be committed 
on separate occasions or be committed by two or more 
persons. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 
CaLRptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
Evidence established time that predicate offenses for 
enhancement of sentence pursuant to this chapter oc-
curred; evidence showed that one of the offenses was 
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incident on October 12, 1989, which gave riae to charges 
against juvenile and that a second assault by gang mem-
bers occurred ua few months" before the March 1990 
hearing, thus showing that at least one of the predicate 
offenses occurred after September 23, 1988, the effective 
date of the chapter, and that one predicate offense oc-
curred within three years of the first In re Nathaniel C. 
(App. 1 Dist. 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
7,5. Admissibility of evidence 
Hearsay from police report* and conversations with 
investigating officers concerning charged incident, as well 
as other information gathered by police in field, is reason-
able basis for officer's expert opinion on matters related to 
aiminal street gang, but officer may not simply recite 
what he was told and must provide foundational testimony 
for opinions which is sufficiently corroborated by other 
competent physical and testimonial evidence. People v. 
Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaL 
App.4th 1509, 38 Cal.App.4th 1125, as modified, review 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 678, 899 
P.2d64. 
Other acts evidence of defendant's gang related activi-
ties was admissible to reveal circumstances of first-degree 
murder and to prove street gang enhancement; the evi-
dence was not directed at disposition to commit other 
crimes. People v. Martin (App. 6 Dist 1994) 28 CaL 
Rptr.2d 660, 23 CaLApp.4th 76, modified on denial of 
rehearing, review denied. 
7.6. Expert testimony 
Expert witness had reasonable basis to give testimony 
and opinions that assaults with deadly weapons were one 
of primary activities of gang, for purposes of establishing 
offense of participation in criminal street gang, in light of 
expert's background and training, personal knowledge and 
experience with gang of which defendant was alleged to 
be member, information gathered from contact and con-
versations with members of gang, and information con-
tained in police department's files. People v. Loeun (App. 
6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 
Cal.App.4th 1125, as modified, review granted and opinion 
superseded 48 CaLRptr.2d 678, 899 P.2d 64. 
Fact that expert witness relied in part on hearsay about 
particular incident did not render improper or inadmissi-
ble expert's opinion that assaults with deadly weapons 
were one of primary activities of gang, for purposes of 
establishing offense of participation in criminal street 
gang, in light of expert's further reliance on personal 
knowledge, observations, experience and investigation, 
and in light of particularity of hearsay used by expert. 
People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 
CaL\pp.4th 1509, 38 Cal.App.4th 1125, as modified, review 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr\2d 678, 899 
P.2d64. 
8. Sufficiency of evidence 
Opinion of expert witness coupled with circumstances of 
alleged attack by defendant and other gang members 
supported finding that one of street gang's primary activi-
ties was commission of assaults with deadly weapons, 
which thus supported conviction for participating in crimi-
nal street gang; expert explained motivation of gang to 
commit assaults and gang's history of assaults, and 
charged incident involved apparent attempt to protect 
gang's turf. People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 
Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 Cal.App.4th 1509, 38 Cal.App.4th 1125, 
as modified, review granted and opinion superseded 43 
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 899 P.2d 64. 
Expert testimony of police officer, who investigated 
murder and had experience with gangs, that murder 
benefited one gang because it promoted the respect of 
§ 186.22 
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that gang was sufficient to establish that murder was 
committed for the benefit of the gang, for purposes of 
criminal 3treet gang enhancement People v. Olguin 
(App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 31 CaLApp.4th 
1355, rehearing denied, review denied. 
Gang expert's opinion hearsay testimony that facts un-
derlying prior convictions involved gang-related crimes 
was insufficient to support convictions of criminal street 
gang offenses and criminal street gang sentence enhance-
ments; expert's testimony regarding facts underlying con-
victions not elicited in form of hypothetical question was 
secondhand testimony which could not constitute substan-
tia] evidence that required predicate offense by gang 
member occurred, and expert's opinion testimony elicited 
in form of hypothetical questions was not supported by 
competent evidence establishing existence of the facts 
upon which the hypothetical questions were based Peo-
ple v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 136, 30 
CaLApp.4th 402, 34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and 
opinion superseded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 ?2d 1115. 
Enhancement of attempted murder defendant's sen-
tence on ground that crime was committed in association 
with criminal street gang was sufficiently supported by 
evidence that predicate offenses committed by other gang 
members were gang related and that intended victim of 
instant offense was member of rival gang who had recentr 
ly been involved in shooting of member of defendant's 
gang. People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 
894, 235 CaLApp.Sd 967. 
Conclusion^ testimony that gang members had previ-
ously engaged in enumerated offenses, based on nonspe-
cific hearsay and arrest information which does not speci-
fy exactly who, when, where, and under what circum-
stances gang crimes were committed, does not constitute 
substantial evidence necessary far criminal street gang 
sentencing enhancement Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 
1991) 282 CaLRptr. 75, 280 CaLApp.3d 1455, review de-
nied. 
Where evidence failed to show that more than one 
member of street gang engaged in commission or attempt-
ed commission of assault with a deadly weapon on particu-
lar occasion, although others were present, that incident 
could not establish pattern of criminal gang activity re-
quired for enhancement of sentence pursuant to this 
chapter. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 
CaLRptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
Evidence established proof of commission or attempted 
commission of assault with a deadly weapon by a member 
of street gang for purposes of sentence enhancement 
pursuant to this chapter, evidence showed that one admit-
ted member of gang was armed with segment of a stair-
way rail and that he got out of a van approximately 80 feet 
away from members of another gang and gave chase while 
still armed with the handrail and that he admitted that if 
he had caught one of the other gang members, "I guess he 
would have just got beat" In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 
Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CalApp.3d 990. 
Police officer's testimony which consisted of only non-
specific hearsay of suspected shooting of one gang mem-
ber by another was insufficient to establish predicate 
offense for sentence enhancement pursuant to this chap-
ter. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 
236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
Evidence was not sufficient to support finding that 
group infant participated with was a "criminal street 
gang^ and thus was not sufficient to support finding that 
infant was guilty of offense of participation in a criminal 
street gang; there was no evidence to show a pattern of 
criminal gang activity by the infant's group, as there was 
no evidence in record to establish that the charged offense 
occurred within three years after a prior offense which 
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was committed on a separate occasion, or by two or more 
gang members. In re Lincoln J. (App. 2 Dist 1990) 272 
Cal.Rptr. 852, 223 CaLApp.3d 322. 
Infant's adjudication of guilt for offense of assault by 
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury could 
not be enhanced under subd. (bXD of this section, where 
there was insufficient evidence to support finding of 
"criminal street gang." In re Lincoln J. (App. 2 Dist 
1990) 272 CaLRptr. 862, 223 CaLApp^d 322. 
In order for a criminal street gang sentence enhance-
ment to be sustained the court must find the existence of 
"criminal street gang" and the record must contain sub-
stantia] evidence to support that finding. In re Lincoln J. 
(App. 2 Dist 1990) 272 CaLRptr. 852, 223 CaLApp.3d 322. 
"Expert testimony" by member of police department 
youth gang task force that gang to which juvenile alleged-
ly belonged had engaged in sale of rock cocaine, commit-
ted vehicle theft, and been involved in assault with deadly 
weapon was not substantial evidence that gang was en-
gaged in ''pattern of criminal gang activity"; testimony 
was based on nonspecific hearsay and arrest information 
and fell far short of requisite of this section. In re Leland 
D. (App. 5 Dist 1990) 272 CaLRptr. 709, 223 CaLAppJd 
251. 
9. Gang purposes or benefit 
Evidence supported jury finding that murder was com-
mitted for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in associa-
tion with a criminal street gang, with specific intent to 
promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by 
gang members and, thus, supported criminal street gang 
enhancement; shooting was precipitated by crossing out 
gang graffiti, replacing it with the name of another gang, 
and then shouting that gang's name to rival gang mem-
bers. People v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 CaLRpfcj\2d 
596,31 CaLApp.4th 1355, rehearing denied, review denied 
For purposes of statute setting forth punishment for 
person who actively participates in any criminal street 
gang and willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any 
felonious criminal conduct by members of a gang, a pat-
tern of gang activity may include charged crime. People 
v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 31 
CaLApp.4th 1355, rehearing denied, review denied 
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when 
state is seeking criminal street gang sentence enhance-
ment, it must be shown that predicate crimes were gang 
related, as statute requires prosecution to prove that gang 
has as one of its primary activities the commission of one 
or more of eight enumerated offenses. People v. Garde-
ley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 CaLRptr^d 136, 30 CaLApp.4th 
402, 34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and opinion 
superseded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115. 
Robbery, murder, and attempted murder of rival gang 
member were committed for gang purposes within mean-
ing of criminal street gang sentence enhancement imposed 
in juvenile proceeding; robbery was committed by gang 
members for purpose of later drive-by shooting, and mur-
der and attempted murder was directed at members of 
rival gangs. Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282 
CaLRptr. 75, 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, review denied 
10. Bifurcation 
Defendant was not entitled to bifurcation of murder 
trial and enhancement for gang activity, enhancement 
PENAL CODE 
concerned mental element present in commission in the 
underlying crime, and same witnesses and much of same 
evidence used to prove murder were also relevant to 
establish circumstances and intent of killing. People v. 
Martin (App. 6 Dist 1994) 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 23 CaL 
App.4th 76, modified on denial of rehearing, review de-
nied. 
After determining that evidence of gang affiliation and 
activity was relevant to prove motive, malice, premedita-
tion, and intent with respect to murder charge against 
defendant, trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting evidence of nine prior incidents of intergang 
retaliation; aD incidents, even those in which defendant 
was not directly involved and those involving attacks by 
rival gang, were relevant to issue of defendant's motive in 
attacking member of rival gang. People v. Funes (App. 1 
Dist 1994) 28 CalRptr.2d 758, 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, modi-
fied on denial of rehearing, review denied. 
Evidence of defer iant's gang affiliation and activity was 
relevant to prove motive, malice, premeditation, and intent 
with respect to murder charge against defendant and trial 
court was thus justified in denying motion to sever or 
bifurcate gang affiliation charges from murder charge; 
evidence regarding gang affiliation and activity directly 
related to defendant's motive for attacking member of 
rival gang, as well as his intent in doing so. People v. 
Funes (App. 1 Dist 1994) 28 CaLRptr^d 758, 23 CaL 
App.4th 1506, modified on denial of rehearing, review 
denied 
11. Instructions 
Jury could be presumed to have foDowed trial court's 
instruction limiting use of hearsay about prior street gang 
incident only to establish basis for expert's opinion, rather 
than improperly relying on hearsay as evidence of predi-
cate offense to establish pattern of criminal gang activity. 
People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 CaLRptr^d 160, S3 
Cal.App.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 678, 899 
P.2d64. 
Instruction defining "pattern of criminal gang activity* 
within meaning of Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act did not have to include a requirement that 
gang's criminal actions amount to or pose the threat of 
continued criminaJ activity. People v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 
1994) 37 CaLRptr^d 596, 31 CaLApp.4th 1355, rehearing 
denied, review denied 
12. Injunction 
Whether California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention (STEP) Act authorized injunction issued by 
trial court to abate gang activity was not an issue, even if 
trial court relied on Act in error, since city, in requesting 
injunction, based its complaint only on public nuisance 
law. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 
Cal.Rptr.2d 589, 34 CaLApp.4th 136, review granted and 
opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 680, 899 ?2d 66. 
California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Preven-
tion (STEP) Act is not exclusive means of enjoining street 
gang activity. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 
1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 589, 34 CaL\pp.4th 136, review 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr 2d 680, 899 
P.2d66. 
§ 186.22a. Buildings or places used by criminal street gangs; nuisance; additional remedies; 
confiscation of firearms or deadly or dangerous weapons owned or possessed by gang 
members 
(a) Every building or place used by members of a criminal street gang for the purpose of the 
commission of the offenses listed in subdivision (c) of Section 186.22 or any offense involving dangerous or 
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deadly weapons, burglary, or rape, and every building or place wherein or upon which that criminal 
conduct by gang members takes place, is a nuisance which shall be eiyoined, abated, and prevented, and 
for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance. 
(b) Any action for injunction or abatement filed pursuant to * • * subdivision (a) shall proceed 
according to the provisions of Article 3 (commencing with Section 11570) of Chapter 10 of Division 10 of 
the Health and Safety Code, except that all of the following shall apply: 
(1) The court shall not assess a civil penalty against any person unless that person knew or should have 
known of the unlawful acts. 
(2) No order of eviction or closure may be entered. 
(3) All injunctions issued shall be limited to those necessary to protect the health and safety of the 
residents or the public or those necessary to prevent further criminal activity. 
(4) Suit may not be filed until 30-day notice of the unlawful use or criminal conduct has been provided 
to the owner by mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the last known address. 
(c) No nonprofit or charitable organization which is conducting its affairs with ordinary care or skill, 
and no governmental entity, shall be abated pursuant to * * * subdivisions (a) and (b). 
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any aggrieved person from seeking any other remedy 
provided by law. 
(e) (1) Any firearm, ammunition which may be used with the firearm, or any deadly or dangerous 
weapon which is owned or possessed by a member of a criminal street gang for the purpose of the 
commission of any of the offenses listed in subdivision (c) of Section 186.22, or the commission of any 
burglary or rape, may be confiscated by any law enforcement agency or peace officer. 
(2) In those cases where a law enforcement agency believes that the return of the firearm, ammunition, 
or deadly weapon confiscated pursuant to this subdivision, is or will be used in criminal street gang 
activity or that the return of the item would be likely to result in endangering the safety of others, the 
law enforcement agency shall initiate a petition in the superior court to determine if the item confiscated 
should be returned or declared a nuisance. 
(3) No firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon shall be sold or destroyed unless reasonable notice is 
given to its lawful owner if his or her identity and address can be reasonably ascertained. The law 
enforcement agency shall inform the lawful owner, at that person^ last known address by registered 
mail, that he or she has 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice to respond to the court clerk to 
confirm his or her desire for a hearing and that the failure to respond shall result in a default order 
forfeiting the confiscated firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon as a nuisance. 
(4) If the person requests a hearing, the court clerk shall set a hearing no later than 30 days from 
receipt of that request The court clerk shall notify the person, the law enforcement agency involved, and 
the district attorney of the date, time, and place of the hearing. 
(5) At the hearing, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency or peace officer to show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the seized item is or will be used in criminal street gang activity or 
that return of the item would be likely to result in endangering the safety of others. All returns of 
firearms shall be subject to subdivision (d) of Section 12072. 
(6) If the person does not request a hearing within 30 days of the notice or the lawful owner cannot be 
ascertained, the law enforcement agency may file a petition that the confiscated firearm, ammunition, or 
deadly weapon be declared a nuisance. If the items are declared to be a nuisance, the law enforcement 
agency shall dispose of the items as provided in Section 12028. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988. Amended by Stats.1990, c. 223 (A.B.3485), § 1; 
Stats.1991, c. 260 (S.B.809), § 1.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1990 Legislation visions (a) and (b)" for ttthis chapter"; and added subd (e) 
The 1990 amendment deleted ", other than residential relating to confiscation of firearms or deadly or dangerous 
buildings in which there are three or fewer dwelling weapons owned or possessed by criminal street gang 
units," twice in subd. (a) following building or other members. 
place". 
1991 Legislation 
The 1991 amendment in subd. (b) substituted "subdivi-
sion (a)" for "this section"; in subd. (c) substituted "subdi-
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Law Review Commentaries 
Review of selected 1990 California legislation. 22 Pac. Review of selected 1991 California legislation. 23 Pac. 
L.J. 501 (1991). LJ. 567 (1992). 
Library References 
California Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant, Friedman, chapter paragraph number references to paragraphs 
Garcia & Hagarty, see Guide's Table of Statutes for discussing this section. 
§ 186»23. Mutual aid activities; labor organizations 
This chapter does not apply to employees engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid and 
protection, or the activities of labor organizations or their members or agents. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
§ 9605. 
Library References 
California Jury Instnictions-^riminal [CALJIC1. 
§ 186J24. Severability 
If any part or provision of this chapter, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of the chapter, including the application of that part or provision to other persons 
or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby and shall continue in full force and effect To this end, the 
provisions of this chapter are severable. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1266, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
§ 9605. 
§ 186.25. Local laws; preemption 
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent a local governing body from adopting and enforcing laws 
consistent with this chapter relating to gangs and gang violence. Where local laws duplicate or 
supplement this chapter, this chapter shall be construed as providing alternative remedies and not as 
preempting the field. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, eff. Sept. 26, 1988.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
§ 9605. 
§ 186.26. Criminal street gang; violent coercion to participate; offense 
(a) Any adult who utilizes physical violence to coerce, induce, or solicit another person who is under 18 
years of age to actively participate in any criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 
186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of 
Section 186.22, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years. 
(b) Any adult who threatens a minor with physical violence on two or more separate occasions within 
any 30-day period with the intent to coerce, induce, or solicit the minor to actively participate in a 
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criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 18622, the members of which engage in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years or in a county jail for up to one year. 
(c) A minor who is 16 years of age or older who commits an offense described in subdivision (a) or (b) 
is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit prosecution'under any other provision of the law. 
(e) No person shall be convicted of violating this section based upon speech alone, except upon a 
showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person, that the defendant had the 
apparent ability to carry out the threat, and that physical harm was imminently likely to occur. 
(Added by Stats.1993, c. 557 (A.B.514), § 1.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Addition of § 18626 as part of Chapter 11, Street 
Terrorism Enforcement And Prevention Act, added by 
Stats. 1988, c. 1242, § 1, failed to become operative due to 
addition of Chapter 11, Street Terrorism Enforcement 
And Prevention Act, by Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1. See 
Gov.C. § 9605. 
(2) The firearm is used to commit the felony. 
Firearms, supply, sell, or give possession to person 
participating in criminal street gangs, see Penal Code 
§ 186.28. 
Provisions similar to those contained in § 186.26 were 
contained in § 5 of Stats.1988, c 1256. See Historical 
Note under § 186.20. 
1992 Legislation 
Addition of this section by § 1 of Stats.1992, c. 920 
(AB.2717), failed to become operative under the provi-
sions of § 2 of that Act 
§ 186.27. Duration of chapter 
This chapter shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and as of that date is repealed, unless a 
later enacted statute, which is chaptered before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends that date. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept. 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988. 
Amended by Stats.1991, c. 201 (A.B.1135), § 2.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legation 1991 Legislation 
s i f t s ^ o ? r i S S S ' S n S ' c S *» ™ - e n ^ t substitute "199T for "1992" as 
j 5^J)5% the year for repeal of the chapter. 
§ 186.28. Firearms; supply, sell or give possess ion; participation in criminal street g a n g s 
(a) Any person, corporation, or firm who shall knowingly supply, sell, or give possession or control of 
any firearm to another shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail for a 
term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine 
and imprisonment if all of the following apply: 
(1) The person, corporation, or firm has actual knowledge that the person will use the firearm to 
commit a felony described in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, while actively participating in any criminal 
street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of 
criminal activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22. 
(3) A conviction for the felony violation under subdivision (e) of Section 186.22 has first been obtained 
of the person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control pursuant to this 
section. 
(b) This section shall only be applicable where the person is not convicted as a principal to the felony 
offense committed by the person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control 
pursuant to this section. 
(Added by Stats.1992, c. 370 (S.B.437), § 1.) 
Cross References 
L a w Review Commentaries 
Review of selected 1992 California legislation. 24 Pac. 
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235 CalAppJd 798 
Wallin, J., concurred in result and filed 
opinion. 
235 Cal.App.3d 957 
j ^ T h e PEOPLE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ralph GAMEZ, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. G009572. 
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
Division 3. 
Oct 30, 1991. 
Certified For Partial Publication * 
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, Orange County, No. C-76286, 
Luis A. Cardenas, J., of, inter alia, attempt-
ed murder, and his sentence was enhanced 
on ground crime was committed in associa-
tion with criminal street gang. On appeal, 
the Court of Appeal, Moore, J., held that: 
(1) expert opinion evidence regarding 
gangs was admissible; (2) criminal street 
gang enhancement statute is neither over-
broad nor vague; and (3) evidence was 
sufficient to support finding that crime was 
committed in association with criminal 
street gang. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <*=>472, 476.6 
Police officers could properly offer ex-
pert opinion evidence regarding attempted 
murder defendant's membership in street 
gang, membership of guests at victim's 
residence in rival gang, and ongoing crimi-
nality of gangs, in that such issues were 
matters beyond common knowledge. 
West's Ann.Cal.Evid.Code § 801. 
2. Criminal Law <s=»469.1 
So long as expert testimony assists 
trier of fact, it is proper even though it 
provides evidence of elements of allega-
tions charged. 
3. Criminal Law <£»486(4) 
Officers established sufficient founda-
tion for their expert opinions regarding 
criminal street gang context in which at-
tempted murder defendant acted; officers' 
opinions were based on personal observa-
tions of and discussions with gang mem-
bers, as well as information from other 
officers and department's files. West's 
Ann.Cal.Evid.Code § 801. 
4. Criminal Law $=»486(4) 
Officers' expert opinions regarding at-
tempted murder defendant's street gang 
affiliation were admissible, though officers 
based opinions in part upon information 
received from unidentified gang members; 
gang members' statements were not of-
fered for truth of matters asserted therein, 
and officers' opinions were also based upon 
personal observation and experience, obser-
vations of other officers, police reports, 
and physical evidence indicative of defen-
dant's gang affiliation. West's Ann.Cal. 
Evid.Code §§ 801(b), 802. 
5. Criminal Law <s-l206.1(1) 
Sentence enhancement provision for 
participation in "criminal street gang" was 
not unconstitutionally overbroad; statute 
regulated criminal conduct, not speech or 
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule published. 
976(b), parts IV, V, VI, VII and Vm are not 
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association, and there was no right of asso-
ciation to engage in criminal conduct 
U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 1, 5, 14; West's 
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22. 
6. Criminal Law *=»1206.1(1) 
Sentence enhancement provision for 
"active participation" in criminal street 
gang was not unconstitutionally vague; to 
be convicted, defendant must have more 
than nominal, passive, inactive or purely 
technical relationship with gang, and per-
son must devote all, or substantial part of 
his time and efforts to criminal street 
gang. U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 1, 14; 
West's Ann.CaLPenal Code § 186.22. 
7. Criminal Law <S=>1206.1(1) 
Sentence enhancement for "member-
ship" in criminal street gang was not un-
constitutionally vague. U.S.CA. Const 
Amends. 1, 14; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code 
§ 186.22. 
& Criminal Law <8=>1206.1(1) 
Sentence enhancement provision for 
participation in "criminal street gang" was 
not unconstitutionally vague; statutory 
definition clarified that it was not mere 
association with others, but rather associa-
tion with others for purpose of committing 
crime, where association's very existence 
was founded upon commission of crime, 
that was prohibited. U.S.CA. Const 
Amends. 1, 14; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code 
§ 186.22. 
9. Constitutional Law <S=»27(K2) 
Criminal Law ^1206.1(1) 
Sentence enhancement provision for 
crimes committed in association with crimi-
nal street gang, with specific intent to pro-
mote, further or assist in criminal conduct 
of members of gang, did not violate due 
process, even though it did not require 
proof that defendant was aware of predi-
cate offenses committed by other gang 
members. U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 5, 14; 
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22. 
10. Criminal Law **1208.6(5) 
Enhancement of attempted murder de-
fendant's sentence on ground that crime 
was committed in association with criminal 
GAMEZ 895 
(CaUpp.4Dlft 1991) 
evidence that predicate offenses committed 
by other gang members were gang related 
and that intended victim of instant offense 
was member of rival gang who had recent-
ly been involved in shooting of member of 
defendant's gang. West's Ann.Cal.Penal 
Code § 186.22(b). 
I Stephen Gilbert, Santa Monica, under 
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 
defendant and appellant 
Ronald Y. Butler, Public Defender, Carl 
C Holmes, Chief Deputy Public Defender, 
and Thomas Havlena, Deputy Public De-
fender, as amici curiae on behalf of defen-
dant and appellant 
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George 
Williamson, Chief Asst Atty. Gen., Harley 
D. Mayfield, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Keith M. 
Motley, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., 
and Karl Terp, Deputy Atty. Gen., for 
plaintiff and respondent 
OPINION 
MOORE, Associate Justice. 
Ralph Gamez (defendant) was convicted 
in a jury trial of attempted murder (count 
I) and assault with a firearm against the 
same victim (count II); assault with a fire-
arm against three additional victims 
(counts III, IV, V); discharging a firearm 
from a vehicle (count VI); and discharging 
a firearm at an unoccupied vehicle (count 
VII). Enhancements for great bodily inju-
ry and great bodily injury in discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle during the attempt-
ed murder and assault with a firearm 
charges in counts I and II and for personal 
use of a firearm in the attempted murder 
and the four assault with a firearm charges 
(counts I through V) were found true. Fi-
nally, defendant was found to have commit-
ted all of the crimes in association with a 
criminal street gang. 
In the published portion of the opinion, 
we consider the following issues raised by 
defendant: (1) The admission of opinion 
evidence regarding gangs was in contra-
vention of the Evidence Code and the con-
frontation clause; and (2) there was insuffi-
896 
cient evidence that defendant committed 
the crimes in association with a criminal 
street gang, as required by section 186.22, 
subdivision (b). 
Amici Curiae further allege the criminal 
street gang enhancement pursuant to Pe-
nal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b) is 
unconstitutional because it (1) is fatally 
overbroad and vague and punishes the 
right to free association in violation of the 
First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution and (2) violates due process of 
law. 
FACTS 
l963Teenagers Yvette Costa and her sister 
Rachel lived with their family in Santa 
Ana. On August 31, 1989, two teenage 
boys, Frankie Castellanos and Rachel's 
boyfriend, Guillermo Briseno, came over 
for dinner. Guillermo, a member of the 
"Highland Street" gang who went by the 
moniker of "Rambo," parked his car in 
front of the house. Police believed Guiller-
mo had been involved in a recent shooting 
directed against a rival gang with whom 
Highland had previously been affiliated, 
"Southside F-Troop" (Southside). 
Later that evening, the Costa sisters and 
two of Yvette's friends, Lorena and Norma 
Quintana, were standing outside the resi-
dence looking at photographs. At about 9 
p.m., a black Nissan truck came around the 
corner with its lights out, followed by a 
Buick Regal. As the truck drove slowly 
by, an individual in the passenger seat of 
the truck pointed a gun out the window 
and fired five to ten shots. 
Yvette screamed that the people in the 
truck were from "South," meaning South-
side. The gun had a long black barrel, and 
the assailant was approximately 14 feet 
away from the girls when he opened fire. 
Lorena was shot in the back but survived. 
The other girls were not hurt 
Tereso Rangel, who lived next door to 
the Costas, had parked his car on the street 
earlier that afternoon. He heard the shots, 
but was unable to inspect his car for dam-
age because police were investigating the 
shooting. He was told his car had been 
damaged. The next morning, he noticed 
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the back window was broken out and his 
car had bullet holes in it 
Yvette Costa identified defendant as the 
shooter to investigating officers and at tri-
al. She knew him by his gang nickname of 
"Hydro." Norma Quintana picked defen-
dant out of a photographic lineup. 
Defendant's residence in Anaheim was 
searched pursuant to warrant approximate-
ly 12 days after the shooting. A black 
Nissan truck was parked in the driveway. 
A box of bullets, paper, books, a plaque, t-
shirt, and a traffic ticket were seized. The 
plaque was addressed to defendant's broth-
er Jerry, a known Southside gang member, 
and had a reference to the Southside gang 
on it The t-shirt had "Southside" printed 
on it The traffic ticket was issued to 
defendant while he had been driving the 
truck. The books and papers were from 
defendant's school and had writing on them 
referring to the Southside gang and "Hy-
dro." 
Three Santa Ana police officers testified 
as experts regarding their knowledge of 
gangs in general and the Southside and 
Highland Street gangs in ^particular. 
Southside and Highland Street had former 
ly been factions within the F-Troop gang, 
but had since split and were now rivals. 
One of the officers opined the shooting was 
a "pay-back" for a prior shooting by High-
land Street against Southside. Another 
opined defendant was a member of South-
side. Photographs taken in October 1987, 
showing defendant with other known 
Southside gang members "throwing'' the 
gang's hand signs, were introduced to cor-
roborate the officers' opinions. Based on 
his own personal knowledge, crime and vic-
tim reports, conversations with other offi-
cers and statements by gang members, one 
officer gave his opinion that Southside was 
a criminal street gang engaged in a pattern 
of criminal activity. 
DEFENSE 
Various family members testified defen-
dant was at home watching television the 
entire evening of August 31, 1989. The 
truck was owned by his brother but was 
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usually driven by his father, who had driv-
en it on August 31 and returned home 
before 9 p.m. 
DISCUSSION 
I 
EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY 
Defendant does not object to the officers' 
testimony concerning criminal street gangs 
in general, involving subjects such as terri-
tory, retaliation, graffiti, hand signals, and 
dress. He does object to the officers being 
allowed to testify that various individuals, 
including defendant, were members of ei-
ther the Southside or Highland gangs, that 
the shooting was in retaliation for a prior 
crime perpetrated on the Southside gang 
by Highland Street involving Guillermo 
Briseno, and various prior crimes were 
perpetrated by Southside rendering them a 
criminal street gang within the meaning of 
section 186.22. Defendant does not cite 
any particular testimony; rather he attacks 
the "opinions as to the reasons for appel-
lant's actions and the actions of others, and 
about appellant's culpability under Penal 
Code section 186.22."l His two primary 
contentions are that (1) the officers' opin-
ions were not of the type which would 
assist the trier of fact and (2) the informa-
tion used by the officers in forming their 
opinions was of a sort that cannot be rea-
sonably relied upon by an expert 
1965^ 4. The Officers' Opinions Were of 
Assistance to the Trier of Fact 
Evidence Code section 801 sets forth the 
grounds for the admission of expert opin-
ion testimony. It states, "If a witness is 
testifying as an expert, his testimony in the 
form of an opinion is limited to such an 
opinion as is: [11] (a) Related to a subject 
that is sufficiently beyond common experi-
ence that the opinion of an expert would 
assist the trier of fact; and [11] (b) Based on 
matter (including his special knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, and education) 
perceived by or personally known to the 
witness or made known to him at or before 
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the hearing, whether or not admissible, 
that is of a type that reasonably may be 
relied upon by an expert in forming an 
opinion upon the subject to which his testi-
mony relates, unless an expert is precluded 
by law from using such matter as a basis 
for his opinion." Defendant relies upon 
People v. Hernandez (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 
271, 138 Cal.Rptr. 675 as support for the 
rather unsjtecific notion that the officers' 
testimony went "too far " In Hernan-
dez, the court found an abuse of discretion 
in admitting a police officer's opinion that 
defendant's shaking his head from side to 
side meant he had been asked if he had any 
more narcotics and had responded that he 
did not (JcL at pp. 274-275, 138 Cal.Rptr. 
675.) The court held the officer's expertise 
did not add any probative value to the 
evidence, which the jury was quite capable 
of analyzing for itself. (Id at p. 281, 138 
Cal.Rptr. 675.) 
[1] Here, the situation was very differ-
ent The relationship between Southside 
and Highland Street, defendant's member-
ship in Southside, the Highland Street 
membership of some of the guests at the 
Costa residence on the night of the shoot-
ing, and the ongoing criminality of South-
side were all matters beyond common 
knowledge. "[T]he decisive consideration 
in determining the admissibility of expert 
opinion evidence is whether the subject of 
inquiry is one of such common knowledge 
that men of ordinary education could reach 
a conclusion as intelligently as the witness 
or whether, on the other hand, the matter 
is sufficiently beyond common experience 
that the opinion of an expert would assist 
the trier of fact [Citations.]" (People v. 
Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99,103, 301 P.2d 854.) 
[2] Section 186.22 requires evidence of 
a gang's past criminal conduct and ongoing 
criminal nature. This may often require 
some expert testimony regarding the activi-
ties of the gang. To the extent such testi-
mony necessarily paralleled elements of the 
criminal street gang allegation, Evidence 
Code section 805 provides, "Testimony in 
the form of opinion that is otherwise admis-
sible is not objectionable because it em-
1. All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 
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braces the ultimate issue to be decided by 
the trier of fact" So long as expert testi-
mony assists the trier of fact, it is proper 
even though it provides evidence of the 
elements of the allegations charged. 
l96eln addition, case law has upheld ex-
pert police officer testimony in the field of 
gang sociology and psychology. In re 
Darrell T. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 325, 153 
Cal.Rptr. 261 is illustrative. There, a high 
school security guard testified in a murder 
prosecution that two campus gangs had 
been rivals for two years prior to the mur-
der. One of the gangs, the "Shotgun 
Crips," fought with the "Fives" gang the 
day before the killing. The security guard 
testified that "[t]he various Crip factions 
would squabble among themselves, but 
would not unite with a non-Crip gang such 
as the Fives to form an alliance. Thus, 
while each of the separate Crip factions 
was, in effect, autonomous, the various 
Crip units involved . . . were by their very 
nature 'anti-Fives/" (Id at pp. 328-329, 
153 Cal.Rptr. 261, fn. omitted.) 
[3] In People v. McDaniels (1980) 107 
Cal.App.3d 898, 166 Cal.Rptr. 12, the court 
upheld testimony from a Los Angeles 
County sheriffs deputy regarding the "so-
cial customs, methods of operation of 
gangs in south central Los Angeles " 
The court referred to the testimony as "so-
ciological evidence," and upheld its admis-
sion over a claim the officer lacked that 
expertise. (Id. at pp. 904-905, 166 Cal. 
Rptr. 12.) People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 1179, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 
1159 is also illustrative, but as an example 
where such testimony was not admitted. 
In Gonzalez, a police officer and gang ex-
pert properly testified on rebuttal concern-
ing gang activities and methods in a certain 
geographical area, but also testified that 
"from his training, experience, and infor-
mation," a defense witness was not an ac-
tive member of a certain gang. (Id at p. 
1237, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.) 
This latter portion of his testimony was 
stricken by the trial court because, on voir 
dire, the officer "conceded his opinion was 
based only on the fact that [the witness's] 
name was unknown to sheriffs investiga-
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tors and did not appear in the department's 
files." (Ibid) In contrast, the officers in 
the case before us were able to establish a 
much stronger foundation for their testimo-
ny by including personal observations of 
and discussions with gang members as well 
as information from other officers and the 
department's files. The foundation for the 
officers' expert opinions was diverse and 
strong, and the opinions were properly ad-
mitted. 
B. The Officers' Expert Opinions Did 
Not Rely On Impermissible Matter 
Defendant contends the officers' opinions 
"were no more than a vehicle for the intro-
duction into evidence of hearsay to prove 
facts that could not lawfully be proven by 
the prosecution." He argues the officers 
relied upon information received from un-
identified and unreliable parties in violation 
of the Evidence Code and the confrontation 
clause. 
Defendant relies upon Isaacs v. Hunt-
ington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 
112, 211 CaLRptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653. In 
Isaacs, 1967QUT Supreme Court indicated 
that, on retrial, the trial court should ex-
clude testimony by an expert witness re-
garding crime statistics of the City of Pasa-
dena gleaned from an unidentified "contact 
at a police department " (Id at p. 133, 
211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653.) The court 
indicated that if the information had been 
received from a more reliable source, such 
as a California Department of Justice re-
port, it would have been admissible. How-
ever, obtaining such information from "an 
unidentified contact in an unidentified po-
lice department scarcely constitutes the 
sort of material that may be reasonably 
relied upon by an expert in forming his 
opinion. [Citation.]" (Id at pp. 133-134, 
211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653.) 
Evidence Code section 801, subdivision 
(b) permits an expert to rely upon other-
wise inadmissible evidence in forming an 
opinion if it is "of a type that reasonably 
may be relied upon by an expert in forming 
an opinion upon the subject to which his 
testimony relates " (See also 2 Jeffer-
son, Cal.Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) 
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§ 29.4, pp. 1026-1027.) Evidence Code sec-
tion 802 provides, "A witness testifying in 
the form of an opinion may state on direct 
examination the reasons for his opinion and 
the matter . . . upon which it is based, 
unless he is precluded by law from using 
such reasons or matter as a basis for his 
opinion " 
[4] Here, the officers opinions were 
based upon personal observations and ex-
perience, the observations of other officers 
in the department, police reports, and con-
versations with other gang members. The 
officers also had a photo of defendant 
"throwing" gang signs with other gang 
members in October 1987, and access to the 
writings on defendant's textbooks and pa-
pers which displayed his gang affiliation. 
They knew defendant had been a Southside 
gang member in the past and had "hung 
out" with its members. In addition, Guil-
lermo Briseno had been implicated as the 
shooter in a prior incident where the victim 
was a Southside member. 
The statements of gang members were 
only a portion of the foundation for the 
officers1 opinions. The situation here is 
thus not analogous to that in Isaacs v. 
Huntington Memorial Hospital, supra, 38 
Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 
where the entirety of the expert's opinion 
was based upon one source who was un-
identified. And, in People v. McDaniels, 
supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 898, 166 Cal.Rptr. 
12, the court, in upholding sociological tes-
timony by a deputy sheriff, stated, "The 
officer established his credentials as fol-
lows: six and one-half years assignment to 
the sheriffs street gang detail in south 
central Los Angeles; he was told to ascer-
tain 'the number of and find out as much 
as best [he could] the names of people who 
belonged to the various gangs in that par-
ticular station's area' by gathering infor-
mation from 'crime reports, interviews . . . 
of people in custody, and conversations 
2. In contrast, in In re Wing Y. (1977) 67 Cal. 
App.3d 69, 136 Cal.Rptr. 390, the court held that 
a police officer's testimony that various witness-
es had reputations as being gang members was 
inadmissible hearsay. {Id at pp. 74-75, 77-78, 
136 Cal.Rptr. 390.) However, the officer was 
t:n I * ~ 
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with young people on the streets/ In addi-
tion, [he] stated that 'as part of [his] duties 
[he had] made an effort to study the social 
customs, methods of operation of gangs in 
south central Losj^sAngeles.'" {Id at p. 
904,166 Cal.Rptr. 12.) The court dismissed 
defendant's contention that the officer's 
opinion was based on improper hearsay and 
violated Evidence Code section 801, stating, 
"Defendant has made no showing that the 
matter relied on here was other than of 'a 
type that reasonably may be relied upon by 
an expert.' Indeed, as the Law Revision 
Commission comment to section 801 notes, 
*[t]he variation in the permissible bases of 
expert opinion is unavoidable in light of the 
wide variety of subjects upon which such 
opinion can be offered. In regard to some 
matter of expert opinion, an expert must, 
if he is going to give an opinion that will be 
helpful to the jury, rely on reports, state-
ments, and other information that might 
not be admissible evidence.' Such was nec-
essarily the case, we think, with regard to 
the type of sociological evidence presented 
in this instance." (Id. at p. 905, 166 Cal. 
Rptr. 12.) * 
We fail to see how the officers could 
proffer an opinion about gangs, and in par-
ticular about gangs in the area, without 
reference to conversations with gang mem-
bers. While the credibility of those sources 
may not be beyond reproach, nevertheless, 
as the court in McDaniels and the Law 
Revision Commission comments to Evi-
dence Code section 801 note, "[t]he varia-
tion in the permissible bases of expert opin-
ion is unavoidable in light of a wide variety 
of subjects upon which such opinion can be 
offered." (Ibid.) To know about the 
gangs involved, the officers had to speak 
with members and their rivals. Further-
more, the officers did not simply regurgi-
tate that which they had been told. Rath-
er, they combined what they had been told 
with other information, including their ob-
therefore his testimony was governed by the 
more restrictive rule under Evidence Code sec-
tion 702 regulating the testimony of a lay wit-
ness, requiring that he have personal knowledge 
concerning the subject matter of his testimony. 
{Id. at pp. 77-78, 136 Cal.Rptr. 390.) 
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servations, in establishing a foundation for 
their opinions. The statements of gang 
members, which in part formed the bases 
of the officers' opinions, were not recited in 
detail during the officers' testimony but 
were referenced in a more general fashion, 
along with other, corroborating informa-
tion.3 "While an expert may state lseson 
direct examination the matters on which he 
relied in forming his opinion, he may not 
testify as to the details of such matters if 
they are otherwise inadmissible. [Cita-
tions.] The rule rests on the rationale that 
while an expert may give reasons on direct 
examination for his opinions, including the 
matters he considered in forming them, he 
may not under the guise of reasons bring 
before the jury incompetent hearsay evi-
dence. [Citation.]" (People v. Coleman 
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92, 211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 
695 P.2d 189; quoting Grimshaw v. Ford 
Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 788-
789, 174 CaLRptr. 348.) 
While we are sensitive to defendant's 
concern that a conviction not be based on 
hearsay testimony, that is not what oc-
curred here. The officers did not simply 
recite what they had been told, but instead 
provided foundational testimony for their 
opinions which was sufficiently corrobo-
rated by other competent evidence, both 
physical and testimonial. Accordingly, we 
do not find that their testimony violated the 
confrontation clause, as the statements 
were not themselves offered for the truth 
of the matters asserted, but instead were 
generally related as one of the bases for 
the officers' expert opinions. (See United 
States v. Lujan (9th Cir.1991) 936 F.2d 406, 
410, citing United States v. Kirk (9th Cir. 
1988) 844 F.2d 660, 663.) Nor do we find 
S. Thus, for example, the officers properly gave 
their opinion of the motive for the shooting, as 
motive was relevant to establish that the crime 
was perpetrated to promote, further, or assist 
the gang. In opining that the shooting was in 
retaliation for an earlier shooting by Highland 
Street against Southside, the officers explained 
that the two gangs did not get along and were 
rivals. This, in turn, was based upon various 
statements by gang members, prior incidents 
involving the gangs, and other information gath-
ered and observations made by the officers. In 
relating the earlier shooting by Highland Street 
against Southside, the officers noted that the 
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the officers based their opinions upon im-
permissible hearsay in violation of the Evi-
dence Code. 
II 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF SECTION 186.22 
Amici argue that section 186.22 is uncon-
stitutional. First, amici claim the term 
"criminal street gang" is vague and over-
broad, thus violating appellant's First 
Amendment right of freedom of associa-
tion. Secondly, amici argue, as does appel-
lant's counsel,4 that the statute violates 
due process unless appellant is shown to 
have knowledge of the predicate offenses 
committed by the gang. We shall treat 
these two contentions separately. 
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth: Free-
dom of Association 
Subdivision (a) of section 186.22 provides, 
"Any person who actively participates in 
any criminal street gang with knowledge 
that its members engage in or have en-
gaged in a pattern of criminal gang activi-
ty, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or 
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by 
members of that gang, shall be punished 
by...." Subdivision (bXl) j^oprovides, 
"Except as provided in paragraph (2), any 
person who is convicted of a felony which 
is committed for the benefit of, at the 
direction of, or in association with any 
criminal street gang, with the specific in-
tent to promote, further, or assist in any 
criminal conduct by gang members, shall, 
upon conviction of that felony, in addition 
and consecutive to the punishment pre-
shooting, and a witness yelled "There's Rambo," 
and "It's Highland Street." Other testimony es-
tablished that Guillermo Briseno, present at the 
Costa house on the night of the shooting, was 
known as "Rambo" and had been a member of 
Highland Street. Also, the gun used in the 
shooting was seized from the home of two self-
admitted members of Highland Street. 
4. Though appellant's counsel raised this issue in 
the context of the sufficiency of the evidence, 
judicial economy dictates it be discussed in this 
portion of the opinion. 
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scribed for the felony or attempted felony 
of which he or she has been convicted, be 
punished by " 
Subdivision (e) provides, "As used in this 
chapter, 'pattern of criminal gang activity* 
means the commission, attempted commis-
sion, or solicitation of two or more of the 
following offenses, provided at least one of 
those offenses occurred after the effective 
date of this chapter and the last of those 
offenses occurred within three years after 
a prior offense, and the offenses are com-
mitted on separate occasions, or by two or 
more persons: . . . " The subsection then 
goes on to list eight categories of predicate 
offenses. 
Subdivision (f) provides, "As used in this 
chapter, 'criminal street gang' means any 
ongoing organization, association, or group 
of three or more persons, whether formal 
or informal, having as one of its primary 
activities the commission of one or more of 
the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs 
(1) to (8), inclusive, of subdivision (e), which 
has a common name or common identifying 
sign or symbol, whose members individual-
ly or collectively engage in or have en-
gaged in a pattern of criminal gang activi-
ty." 
15] Defendant first claims the definition 
of "criminal street gang" found in subdivi-
sion (f) is too broad to survive constitution-
al scrutiny. He argues section 186.22 pun-
ishes membership in groups as diverse as 
the Los Angeles Police Department, Hum-
boldt County environmental activists, or, 
for that matter, any group whose individ-
ual members may commit criminal of-
fenses. Defendant claims the fact that the 
statute could apply to such diverse groups 
renders it overbroad and void for vague-
ness. He attempts to distinguish People v. 
Green (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 278 Cal. 
Rptr. 140, which held section 186.22 is not 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, on 
the grounds Green did not address the 
outer boundaries of the statute's applica-
tion, or First Amendment freedom of asso-
ciation issues. 
"[TJhe mere fact that one can conceive of 
some impermissible applications of a stat-
ute is not sufficient to render it susceptible 
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to an overbreadth challenge." (City Coun-
cil v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 
U.S. 789, 800, 104 S.Ct 2118, 2126, 80 
L.Ed.2d 772.) Defendant's analogy to the 
Los Angeles Police Department is thus in-
apposite. Penal Code section 186.22, subdi-
vision (f) defines "criminal street gang" as 
an ongoing organization having "as one of 
its primary activities" the commission of 
one of the enumerated offenses. Though 
members of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment may commit an ^enumerated of-
fense while on duty, the commission of 
crime is not a primary activity of the 
department. Penal Code section 186.22 
does not punish association with a group of 
individuals who, in a separate capacity, 
may commit crimes. Rather, it requires 
that one of the primary activities of the 
group or association itself be the commis-
sion of crime. The section regulates con-
duct, not speech or association, and there is 
no right of association to engage in crimi-
nal conduct Similarly, environmental ac-
tivists or any other group engaged in civil 
disobedience could not be considered a 
criminal street gang under the statutory 
definition unless one of the primary activi-
ties of the group was the commission of 
one of the eight enumerated crimes found 
within the statute. On the other hand, one 
is free to associate with whomever one 
wishes under the statute, so long as the 
primary purpose of associating one's self 
with the group is not to commit crime. It 
is not the association with other individuals 
alone which section 186.22 addresses, but 
the association with others for the purpose 
of promoting, furthering or assisting 
them in the commission of crime. 
In order for a statute which regulates 
conduct to be considered overbroad, "the 
overbreadth of a statute must not only be 
real, but substantial as well, judged in rela-
tion to the statute's plainly legitimate 
sweep." (Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973) 
413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37 
L.Ed.2d 830.) A finding of overbreadth 
entails a statute that achieves its goal "by 
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly 
and thereby invade the area of protected 
freedoms." (NAACP v. Alabama (1964) 
902 
377 U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct 1302, 1314, 12 
L.Ed.2d 325.) This statute does not invade 
the area of protected freedoms. It does 
not seek to regulate speech but conduct, 
and regulates only conduct which is crimi-
nal. The right of association is affected 
only to the extent the purpose of associa-
tion is the perpetuation of criminal activity. 
Since section 186.22 seeks only to regulate 
association which is directed towards the 
perpetuation of criminal activity, its sweep 
is not overbroad. 
[6,7] In regard to vagueness, "a stat-
ute must be sufficiently definite to provide 
adequate notice of the conduct pro-
scribed [11] [It] must provide suffi-
ciently definite guidelines for the police in 
order to prevent arbitrary and discriminato-
ry enforcement." (People v. Superior 
Court (Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 389-
390, 250 Cal.Rptr. 515, 758 P.2d 1046.) 
However, "[Reasonable certainty is all 
that is required. A statute will not be held 
void for vagueness if any reasonable and 
practical construction can be given its lan-
guage or if its terms may be made reason-
ably certain by reference to other definable 
sources. [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of 
Walton (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 108, 116, 104 
Cal.Rptr. 472.) " ' . . . [T]he constitution 
does not require impossible standards'; all 
that is required is that the language 'con-
veys sufficiently definite warning as to the 
proscribed conduct when ^measured by 
common understanding and practices ' 
[Citation omitted.]" (Roth v. United 
States (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct 
1304, 1312, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498.) 
This statute purports to regulate conduct 
involving membership in an organization 
which has as one of its primary activities, 
and therefore purposes, the commission of 
crime. Moreover, it is not merely the pas-
sive association with such a group which is 
criminalized, but the active participation in 
the group which renders one susceptible to 
prosecution. The statute requires that an 
individual either wilfully [subsection (a) ] or 
with specific intent [subsection (bXl) ] "pro-
mote, further, or assist in any [felonious] 
criminal conduct" by members of that 
gang. Quoting from our colleagues in Pea-
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pie v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 
278 Cal.Rptr. 140: "Section 186.22 does not 
make 'membership' criminal; rather, under 
specified circumstances it makes 'active 
participation' criminal. By using the 
phrase 'actively participates,' the California 
Legislature evidently sought to prevent 
prosecution of persons who were no more 
than nominal or inactive members of a 
criminal street gang. The phrase, in con-
text, has the same meaning as 'active mem-
bership' as defined by the case law. To be 
convicted of being an active participant in a 
street gang, a defendant must have a rela-
tionship with a criminal street gang which 
is (1) more than nominal, passive, inactive 
or purely technical and (2) the person must 
devote all, or a substantial part of his time 
and efforts to the criminal street gang. So 
construed, we see little likelihood that the 
phrase will permit arbitrary law enforce-
ment or provide inadequate notice to poten-
tial offenders. [11] Neither do we see any 
difficulty with the term 'membership,' a 
term which, as discussed, has an ordinary 
meaning and which has been defined fur-
ther in the cases. It is true that the term 
is not susceptible of precise definition, but 
absolute definition is not required. The 
argument that 'membership' is overbroad 
as potentially including persons who have 
been intimidated into membership is irrele-
vant Section 186.22 does not prohibit 
membership; it prohibits the promotion, 
furtherance or assistance in any felonious 
criminal conduct by members. That a 
member may not be a whole-hearted partic-
ipant in the felonious criminal conduct 
should have no bearing on the criminal 
liability of the person who promotes, fur-
thers or assists such conduct." (Ibid, at p. 
700, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) 
[8] In addition, while the word "gang" 
may be vague, the term "criminal street 
gang" is not. As Green points out, "[S]ec-
tion 186.22, subdivision (a) does not make it 
criminal to be a member of an undefined 
'gang'; it prohibits membership in a 'crimi-
nal street gang,' . . ." (IcL at p. 701, 278 
Cal.Rptr. 140.) The definition of a criminal 
street gang as "any ongoing organization, 
association, or group of three or more per-
sons, whether formal or informal, having 
PEOPLE v 
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as one of its primary activities the commis-
sion of one or more of the criminal acts 
enumerated," specifically apprises an indi-
vidual that it is not i^mere association 
with others, but association with others for 
the purpose of committing crime, where 
the association's very existence is founded 
upon the commission of crime, that is pro-
hibited. This is not vague. (See § 186.22, 
subd. (f); People v. Green, supra, at pp. 
701-702, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) 
Defendant analogizes to In re Timothy 
R. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 593, 248 Cal.Rptr. 
721, where the court struck down a local 
ordinance which purported to prohibit "the 
presence on properly posted business or 
commercial premises or other private prop-
erty of anyone who does not have written 
permission from the owner, lessee or other 
person in charge. [Fn. omitted.]" (Id. at 
pp. 595-596, 248 Cal.Rptr. 721.) Yet there, 
the court noted the problem with the stat-
ute was that it was susceptible to subjec-
tive police enforcement and interpretation. 
(Id. at pp. 600-601, 248 Cal.Rptr. 721.) 
Such a potential for arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement goes to the very heart 
of vagueness. (People v. Superior Court 
(Caswell), supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 389-390, 
250 CaLRptr. 515, 758 P.2d 1046.) 
Here, the danger of such selective or 
arbitrary enforcement is not present The 
standards enunciated in section 186.22 are 
capable of being "objectively ascertained 
by reference to common experiences of 
mankind." (See People v. Daniels (1969) 
71 Cal.2d 1119, 1129, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 
P.2d 225.) 
B. Section 186.22 Does Not Violate 
Due Process 
Defendant urges that, if this court does 
not hold section 186.22 to be unconstitu-
tional per se, the court should strictly con-
strue it to avoid punishing "association ac-
tivity." Defendant argues such strict con-
struction requires the prosecution to prove 
he was aware of the predicate offenses 
committed by other gang members. With-
5. Subdivision (a) of section 186.22 requires that 
knowledge of the pattern of gang activity be 
. GAMEZ 903 
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out such strict construction, he argues, he 
would be punished for pure "association" 
activity without any knowledge of facts 
causing his association with the group to 
fall within the parameters of the statute. 
In Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939) 306 U.S. 
451, 59 S.Ct 618, 83 L.Ed. 888, the United 
States Supreme Court held that due pro-
cess requires that "[a]ll . . . be informed as 
to what the State commands or forbids. 
[Fn. omitted.]" (Id at p. 453, 59 S.Ct at 
619.) Defendant also argues that, since 
subdivision (a) requires actual knowledge 
that other members of the group have en-
gaged in a pattern of criminal activity, the 
same must be true for an imposition of 
sentence under subdivision (b).5 
Subdivision (a) of section 186.22, which 
was not charged, punishes an active mem-
ber of a criminal street gang who wilfully 
promotes, furthers, or assists in the feloni-
ous conduct of the gang "with knowledge 
that its iwjmembers engage in or have 
engaged in pattern of criminal gang ac-
tivity " (Italics added.) It is not an 
enhancement, but a substantive offense, 
and punishes one who, with knowledge of 
the criminal nature of the gang, willfully 
promotes or assists it in its pursuit of 
crime. Subdivision (b) is an enhancement, 
and creates additional punishment for any-
one who commits a felony for the benefit 
of, at the direction of, or in association with 
a street gang, as that term is defined, and 
with the specific intent to promote, further, 
or assist in the criminal conduct of mem-
bers of the gang. The two subdivisions are 
also distinct because they punish complete-
ly separate conduct The gravamen of sub-
division (a) is the participation in the gang 
itself. This "active" participation must re-
quire knowledge of the gang's primary ac-
tivities; this is axiomatic and included in 
the statutory language. Subdivision (b), 
however, is narrower. It is directed at a 
particular crime. It punishes an individual 
who has committed a crime for the benefit 
of a gang and with the specific intent to 
promote, further, or assist in any criminal 
conduct by members of the gang. It does 
proved. This requirement is absent from the 
language of subdivision (b). 
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not require knowledge of the predicate of-
fenses as a prerequisite to its imposition. 
"[S]tatutes must be construed in a rea-
sonable and common sense manner " 
(Herbert Hawkins Realtors, Inc. v. Mil-
heiser (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 334, 338, 189 
Cal.Rptr. 450.) Nothing in the statute indi-
cates that knowledge of the specific predi-
cate offenses need be shown. The fact 
that subdivision (a) refers to and requires 
knowledge of a pattern of criminal gang 
activity is evidence that the failure to refer 
to knowledge in subdivision (b) was not a 
negligent omission by the legislature and 
that knowledge is not required to be prov-
en.* "[A]bsent a constitutional basis for 
departure from a clear expression of legis-
lative intent, we are bound thereby." 
(Steed v. Imperial Airlines (1974) 12 
Cal.3d 115,120,115 Cal.Rptr. 329, 524 P.2d 
801.) 
j^sHowever, defendant seeks to require 
the prosecution to prove in subdivision (b) 
not only defendant's commission of a crime 
with the stated purpose and intent, but also 
his actual knowledge of the specific predi-
cate offenses committed. He urges us to 
adopt a knowledge requirement even 
though the statute is not so written, argu-
ing that, if the statute is to pass constitu-
tional muster, knowledge of the predicate 
offenses must be required. He further 
maintains that our failure to require that 
knowledge of the predicate offenses be 
proved would be tantamount to condoning 
the state's interference in an individual's 
constitutional right of association. 
6. The court in People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal. 
App.3d 692, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140 stated that "Crimi-
nal liability under section 186.22 requires that a 
defendant have knowledge that the criminal 
street gang's members engage in a pattern of 
criminal conduct" (Id. at p. 702, 278 Cal.Rptr. 
140.) However, this language is taken directly 
from subdivision (a) of that section; it is not 
found anywhere in subdivision (b). This is in-
dicative of a problem which permeates the 
Green decision; the court continually refers to 
section 186.22 when its primary focus is on 
subdivision (a) of that section. As we have 
pointed out, subdivision (b) is quite distinct 
from subdivision (a). Subdivision (a), a sub-
stantive offense, requires active participation in 
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In People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal. 
App.3d 692, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, the court 
analogized to the federal RICO statute, 
which criminalizes an individual's associa-
tion with an enterprise which is involved in 
a "pattern of racketeering activity." 
"Plaintiff must show 'evidence [that defen-
dant is part] of an ongoing organization, 
formal or informal, and ... evidence that 
the various associates [of the organization] 
function as a continuing unit*" (Montesa-
no v. Seafirst Commercial Corp. (5th Cir. 
1987) 818 F.2d 423, 426, quoting Atkinson 
v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co. (5th Cir. 
1987) 808 F.2d 438, 440; see also United 
States v. Turkette (1981) 452 U.S. 576, 583, 
101 S.Ct 2524, 2528, 69 LEd.2d 246.) The 
government must show the organization is 
involved in racketeering activity, which is 
defined as the commission of various predi-
cate offenses within a certain time period, 
and defendant's association with the orga-
nization is for the purpose of promoting 
such racketeering activity. However, 
knowledge of the predicate offenses them-
selves is not required. Even so, the RICO 
statute has survived numerous constitu-
tional challenges. (See, e.g., United States 
v. Tripp (6th Cir.1986) 782 F.2d 38, 42.) 
[9] Nor do we see any reason to require 
knowledge of the specific, charged predi-
cate offenses here. A gang becomes a 
criminal street gang when one of its pri-
mary activities is the commission of various 
crimes. An individual who commits an of-
fense for the benefit of or in association 
gage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity—" Subdivision (b), an enhance-
ment, contains no similar language. In the ab-
sence of language to the contrary, we cannot 
impose an additional requirement to subdivi-
sion (b) which the Legislature obviously did not 
intend to require. (See People v. Vaughn (1961) 
196 Cal.App.2d 622, 629, 16 Cal.Rptr. 711.) Nor 
is this opinion in disagreement with People v. 
Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 278 Cal.Rptr. 
140, as that opinion upheld a conviction for 
section 186.22, subdivision (a), and was not 
called upon, as are we, to rule upon the validity 
of subdivision (b). "[C]ases ... are not authori-
ty for propositions not there considered." (Peo-
ple v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal3d 470, 481. 116 
PEOPLE • 
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with the gang and with the specific intent 
to promote, further or assist members of 
the gang becomes liable for an additional 
sentence enhancement Due process con-
cerns would only be raised if the enhance-
ment did not provide, "(1) a standard of 
conduct for those whose activities are pro-
scribed and (2) a standard for police en-
forcement and for ascertainment of guilt" 
(Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 
257, 269, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732.) 
"[E]ven where persons of ordinary intelli-
gence . . . differ with respect to the mean-
ing of a statutory term . . . [s]uch differ-
ences do not necessarily make the statutes 
void." (People v. Sassounian (1986) 182 
Cal.App.3d 361, 412, 226 Cal.Rptr. 880.) 
All that is required is that ordinary people 
can understand what kind of conduct is 
prohibited with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty, by reference, if need be, to other 
definablejjpesources. (County of Nevada 
v. MacMillen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 662, 673,114 
Cal.Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1345. See also 
People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 
266, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) 
Such a reasonable degree of certainty is 
attained. There is nothing in the phrase 
"promote, further or assist" which cannot 
be comprehended with a reasonable degree 
of certainty. Ordinary people should not 
have any trouble discerning that the stat-
ute penalizes those whose felonious con-
duct is undertaken with the intent to pro-
mote, further or assist a criminal street 
gang. Nor is the definition of criminal 
street gang beyond reasonable ascertain-
ment The requisite elements of such an 
organization are clearly set forth in subdi-
vision (f), and the predicate offenses which 
constitute a "pattern of criminal gang ac-
tivity" are listed in subdivision (e). 
In failing to compel knowledge of the 
predicate offenses themselves, the Legisla-
ture did not offend notions of due process. 
The requirement that defendant commit 
the crime for the benefit of or in the associ-
ation with the gang and with the specific 
intent to promote, further, or assist mem-
bers of the gang in any criminal conduct is 
sufficient to appease any concerns regard-
ing a violation of due process based upon 
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us to require knowledge of the predicate 
offenses, as the conduct proscribed by the 
statute is ascertainable to a reasonable de-
gree of certainty and involves felonious 
conduct undertaken with a specific, crimi-
nal intent In short, an individual who 
violates subdivision (b) does so at the peril 
that the history of his gang will reveal the 
predicate offenses. 
Ill 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE-
SECTION 186.22, SUBDIVISION 
(b) 
[10] Defendant contends the evidence 
adduced at trial was insufficient to show 
his conduct fell within the purview of sec-
tion 186.22, subdivision (b). It requires de-
fendant's conduct to be "committed for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, or in associa-
tion with any criminal street gang, with the 
specific intent to promote, further, or assist 
in any criminal conduct by gang mem-
bers " Defendant argues the evidence 
was insufficient to show the existence of a 
street gang, that the offense was commit-
ted for the benefit of or in association with 
a street gang, and that it was committed 
with the specific intent to promote, further, 
or assist a street gang. We disagree. 
A Sufficient Evidence Existed That 
Southside Was a Criminal Street 
Gang 
Defendant contends there was insuffi-
cient evidence Southside was a criminal 
street gang. He contends the proffered 
evidence of predicate offenses lyndid not 
establish that those offenses, though they 
may have been committed by Southside 
gang members, were in any way related to 
the gang or to defendant's association with 
the gang. However, the evidence belies his 
contention. 
An appellate court cannot reverse a con-
viction on a claim of insufficient evidence 
unless it clearly appears "that upon no 
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient sub-
stantial evidence to support it. [Citation.]" 
(People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 
755. 79 CaLRotr. 529. 457 P.2d 321.) We 
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must review the whole record in the light 
most favorable to the judgment and pre-
sume in support of the judgment the exist-
ence of every fact the trier could reason-
ably deduce from the evidence. (People v. 
Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 117, 181 Cal. 
Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253; People v. John-
son (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 162 Cal.Rptr. 
431, 606 P.2d 738.) The critical question is, 
"'whether, after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'" (Ibid., quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 
318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 278&-2789, 61 
L.Ed.2d 560.) 
We need not repeat the evidence that 
established Southside as an entity; that 
evidence was abundant The officers who 
testified believed Southside had been en-
gaged in a rivalry or "war" with Highland 
Street for at least a year. Certified court 
documents were introduced to establish 
five individuals affiliated with Southside 
had been convicted of various of the eight 
enumerated offenses found in section 186.-
22, subdivision (e). Expert testimony es-
tablished these affiliations.7 
Defendant argues even if the predicate 
crimes were shown, there was no proof 
they were related in any way to the gang 
itself. We agree with defendant it must be 
shown the predicate crimes were gang re-
lated, as section 186.22, subdivision (f) re-
quires the prosecution to prove that the 
7. The testimony established that the predicate 
crimes were committed by Southside and that 
Southside was a criminal street gang within the 
meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (f). 
Southside had a name and identified itself in a 
common manner on graffiti; it had its own 
hand signs and had as one of its primary activi-
ties the commission of various of the statutorily-
enumerated crimes. The proof was quantita-
tively and qualitatively distinct from that found 
insufficient in In re Lincoln J. (1990) 223 Cal. 
App.3d 322, 327-330, 272 Cal.Rptr. 852. Much 
of the testimony specifically related to South-
side and was offered by experts who were famil-
iar with Southside and who had worked or did 
work in Southside territory. (Compare In re 
Nathaniel C (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1004-
1005, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236 [expert did not identify 
subject gang as operating in his area; in fact, 
^YfV»rt w a c f r n m a n n t h p r inric/ft^Hrkri on/) A\A 
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gang has "as one of its primary activities" 
the commission of one or more of the eight 
enumerated offenses. To allow otherwise 
would be to punish defendant for 1978the 
unrelated actions of people with whom he 
associated. Yet this was not the case. 
One of the five convictions involved the 
killing of two individuals on a bicycle shot 
in a rival gang's territory. There, a South-
side member was searching for rival gang 
members to shoot in retaliation for a crime 
committed against Southside. In another 
conviction, a Southside gang member killed 
the father of a rival gang member after 
firing at and missing the gang member.8 
This evidence, when coupled with expert 
testimony about how gangs such as South-
side are motivated and how offenses perpe-
trated against the gang are met with retali-
ation, was more than sufficient to establish 
that, at least with respect to these two 
predicate offenses, they were gang related. 
This is all the statute requires. 
B. Sufficient Evidence Was Adduced 
that Defendant Committed the In-
stant Offense For the Benefit of the 
Gang and With the Specific Intent 
to Promote or Assist the Gang 
Defendant contends there was no proof 
the shooting was done with the intent to 
promote, further or assist criminal conduct 
by Southside. This is also belied by the 
evidence. Defendant drove to a location in 
Highland Street territory. Expert testimo-
ny established that Hispanic gangs are ex-
not offer testimony specific to the subject 
gangj.) 
8. The certified copies of the convictions, com-
bined with the recitation of the facts surround-
ing those crimes, supplied proof of the "who, 
when, where and under what circumstances 
..." found lacking in In re Leland Z>. (1990) 223 
Cal.App.3d 251, 259, 272 Cal.Rptr. 709. The 
predicate offenses were established by specific 
expert testimony and certified conviction 
records, not by "vague, secondhand testimony 
...," as occurred in In re Nathaniel C, supra, 
228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1003, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236. 
The predicate offenses were factually and tem-
porally distinct, and thus occurred, as is re-
quired, on separate occasions. (See In re Jose T. 
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462-1464, 282 CaL 
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tremely territorial; venturing onto another 
gang's "turf" is done at great risk. A car 
parked in front of the Costa residence be-
longed to Guillermo Briseno, also known as 
"Rambo," who had recently been involved 
in the shooting of a Southside gang mem-
ber. In the culture of gangs, such an 
incident could not go unavenged and would 
warrant a retaliatory strike. This consti-
tuted sufficient evidence that defendant's 
actions were done with the intent to aid and 
promote Southside. 
Defendant cites two cases which found 
insufficient evidence to show criminal gang 
conduct within the meaning of section 186.-
22. (In re Lincoln J., supra, 223 Cal. 
App.3d 322, 272 Cal.Rptr. 852; In re he-
land D., supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 251, 272 
Cal.Rptr. 709.) He does not claim, nor do 
we find, that these cases involved facts 
analogous to those here. He also cites the 
case law involving conspiracy and argues 
that body of law is apposite. He refers 
primarily to those conspiracy cases which 
found insufficient evidence of an "agree-
ment" However, section I979I86.22 does 
not require any sort of agreement between 
gang members. The elements of conspir-
acy are not the same, and we are uncon-
vinced the conspiracy cases cited are of any 
benefit to defendant. 
IV-VIII** 
CONCLUSION 
The stay is removed from the enhance-
ment imposed for the personal use of a 
firearm (§ 12022.5) in count I, and the en-
hancement imposed for discharging a 
weapon from a vehicle causing great bodily 
injury (§ 12022.55) attendant to that count 
is ordered stricken. The enhancements im-
posed for the personal use of a firearm 
(§ 12022.5) in counts III, IV and V are 
**See footnote *, ante. 
1. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 
976(b), part II of the concurring opinion is not 
published. 
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ordered stricken, and the consecutive sen-
tence imposed in count VII is ordered 
stayed per section 654. (§ 1260.) The su-
perior court clerk is directed to modify the 
abstract of judgment accordingly and 
transmit it to the Department of Correc-
tions and other appropriate agencies. In 
all other respects, the judgment is af-
firmed. 
CROSBY, Acting PJ., concurs. 
WALLIN, Associate Justice, concurring. 
I1 
I concur in the result only, making the 
following observations about the lead opin-
ion. 
Much of the officers' "expert" testimony 
was rank regurgitation of hearsay coming 
from highly unreliable sources—rival gang 
members. The majority opinion glosses 
over this fact, but should not However, 
any error was harmless. Sufficient infor-
mation was from personal observations or 
reliable sources,2 and it is not likely the 
verdict would have differed without the 
improper matter. (People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) 
Similarly, it was error to allow the testi-
mony on such ultimate issues as Gamez's 
gang membership and whether Southside is 
a criminal street gang. hsoOnce the jury 
had the benefit of the officers' expertise on 
how such gangs operate, their symbols, 
and other topics, the jurors were as able as 
the officers to decide the ultimate issues. 
(See People v. Brown (1981) 116 Cal. 
App.3d 820, 829, 172 Cal.Rptr. 221.) But 
this error was also harmless because it is 
not probable it affected the verdict 
I disagree with the lead opinion's conclu-
sion that circumstantial evidence was not a 
large part of the prosecution case. Al-
though the identification of Gamez was di-
rect evidence, much of the admissible evi-
2. For this reason, I also would find the evidence 
sufficient to show Southside was a criminal 
street gang. 
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dence showing his gang membership, the 
criminal street gang status of Southside, 
and his intent in doing the acts was circum-
stantial. The jury should have been in-
structed on circumstantial evidence. How-
ever, it is not reasonably likely the verdict 
would have differed had instructions been 
given. 
! ! • • • 
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Diego County, No. J157882, Runston G. 
Maino, J., under statute providing for en-
hancement where gang activity was in-
volved. Juvenile appealed. The Court of 
Appeal, Huffman, J., held that enhance-
ment provision was not unconstitutionally 
vague or overbroad and did not violate 
equal protection. 
Affirmed. 
235 Cal.App.3d 1309 
j ^ I n re ALBERTO R, a Person 
Coining Under the Juvenile 
Court Law. 
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
• . 
ALBERTO R, a Minor, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. D012369. 
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
Division 1. 
Nov. 7, 1991. 
After allegations regarding offenses 
committed during course of drive-by shoot-
ing were found to be true, juvenile was 
sentenced in the Superior Court of San 
mcnt as contrary to the public policy behind 
section 11580.2. The Supreme Court pointed 
out that purpose of the statute was "to minimize 
losses to the people of California who are in-
volved in accidents with uninsured or financial-
ly irresponsible motorists " (Ibid.) The 
1. Criminal Law <S=>1209 
Statute pursuant to which act punisha-
ble in different ways under different provi-
sions of Penal Code may not be punished 
under more than one such provision only 
bars multiple punishment, not multiple con-
viction. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 654. 
2. Constitutional Law <s=>82(4) 
To successfully challenge statute as 
overbroad, overbreadth must not only be 
real, but must be substantial as well, 
judged by legitimate reach of law. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 1, 14. 
3. Constitutional Law <3=»251.4 
Fact that word or phrase in statute is 
somewhat imprecise does not per se violate 
due process requirements. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14. 
4. Criminal Law e=>1206.1(l) 
"Promote, further, or assist" as used 
in statute providing for sentence enhance-
ment for defendant convicted of felony as 
criminal street gang member was not un-
constitutionally vague or overbroad inas-
much as phrase had been consistently used 
by courts to describe aiding and abetting. 
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b). 
5. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations <5=>101 
When narrowly construed to pertain 
only to conduct that was purely felonious, 
i.e., punishable in state prison, phrase "fel-
onious criminal conduct" as used in statute 
making it offense to promote, further, or 
high court went on to say the statute expresses 
the public policy that an insured should "be 
protected against damages for bodily injury 
caused by an uninsured motorist in the same 
territory in which the policy covers him for 
liability." (Ibid) 
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assist such conduct by gang members was 
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
West's Ann.CaLPenal Code § 186.22(a). 
6. Criminal Law $=>1206.1(1) 
"Benefit" as used in statute providing 
for sentence enhancement for defendant 
convicted of felony as criminal street gang 
member where felony is for benefit of 
street gang was not unconstitutionally 
vague or overbroad when term was read in 
conjunction with statute's qualifying lan-
guage so as to limit scope to only those 
acts committed with specific intent to pro-
mote, further, or assist in any criminal 
conduct by gang members. West's 
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b). 
7. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations $=>101 
Phrase "and the last of those offenses 
occurred within three years after a prior 
offense," which was part of definition of 
"pattern of criminal gang activity" con-
tained in Street Terrorism Enforcement 
and Prevention Act, was not unconstitu-
tionally vague or overbroad, despite defen-
dant's anticipated scenarios in which gang 
members could be charged for crimes in 
future of which they had no knowledge and 
in which they did not participate. West's 
Ann.CaLPenal Code § 186.22(a, e). 
8. Criminal Law «=-1206.1(1) 
"Primary activities" as used in statu-
tory definition of "criminal street gang" 
whose members could receive sentence en-
hancement if convicted of felony as mem-
ber was not unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad despite contention that enforce-
ment would be arbitrary based on who 
made decision of what gang's primary ac-
tivities were; Street Terrorism Enforce-
ment and Prevention Act, of which phrase 
was part, specifically listed felonious con-
duct required to invoke its provisions. 
West's Ann.CaLPenal Code § 186.22(b, f). 
9. Criminal Law <3=-1206.3(l) 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations <3=>102 
Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act and its provision for sen-
tence enhancement for defendant convicted 
IN RE ALBERTO R, 
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of felony as criminal street gang member 
did not vest unfettered discretion; Act spe-
cifically designated crimes in which gang 
had to be involved. West's Ann.Cal.Penal 
Code § 186.22(b, e, f). 
10. Criminal Law <$=»1206.1(1) 
Statutory provision pursuant to which 
defendant convicted of felony as criminal 
street gang member was subject to sen-
tence enhancement if felony was convicted 
with "specific intent to promote, further, or 
assist in any criminal conduct by gang 
members" provided adequate notice of 
what conduct was proscribed and was not 
unconstitutionally vague. West's 
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b). 
11. Criminal Law <$=>1206.1(1) 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations <$=>101 
Statute making it offense to actively 
participate in criminal street gang activity 
and providing for sentence enhancement 
based on that activity is not unconstitution-
ally overbroad. West's Ann.Cal.Penal 
Code § 186.22; U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 1, 
14. 
12. Constitutional Law e=>250.3(l) 
Criminal Law «=>1206.1(1) 
Statute providing for sentence en-
hancement for defendant convicted of felo-
ny as criminal street gang member did not 
violate equal protection despite defendant's 
characterization of enhancement as being 
similar to crime of conspiracy, which in-
cluded procedural safeguards that enhance-
ment did not; conspiracy required agree-
ment with others to commit offense, while 
enhancement statute required active partic-
ipation in felonious criminal gang activity, 
and defendant subject to enhancement was 
not similarly situated to defendant charged 
with conspiracy. West's Ann.Cal.Penal 
Code § 186.22(b); U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
14. 
li3i2Catherine Aragon, under appoint-
ment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant 
and appellant 
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George 
Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Harley 
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D. Mayfield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Keith I. Mot- to have conspired to commit murder 
ley and Esteban Hernandez, Deputy Atty. (§§ 187, 182), to have attempted to commit 
Generals, for plaintiff and respondent murder (§§ 187, 664), and to have commit-
ted an assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. 
_Li3i3HUFFMAN, Associate Justice. (aX2)). The attempted murder was alleged 
On this appeal we determine the sen- to h a v e b e e n "willful, deliberate, and pre-
tence enhancement defined in Penal Code l meditated" as defined in sections 664.1 and 
section 186.22, subdivision (b), enacted as 189- lt w a s a l s o alleged the attempted 
part of the Street Terrorism Enforcement m u r d e r a n d t h e a r m e d a s s a u l t w e r e con>-
and Prevention Act (the Act), is facially m i t t e d by Alberto as a gang member under 
constitutional and constitutional as applied section 186.22, subdivision (bX2), and that a 
in this case. firearm was used to commit both crimes 
within the meaning of section 12022.5. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND2 
On February 7, 1990, at about 5 p.m., 
Alberto R., a member of the 38th Street 
Shelltown Gang (Shelltown), was a passen-
ger, along with three other Shelltown mem-
bers, in his ex-girlfriend's car, which she 
was driving at his request through rival 
gang territory, following another car. As 
the cars turned the corner, driving in front 
of La Central Store (La Central), a regular 
hangout for the Logan Red Steps (Red 
Steps) across from Chicano Park, a person 
in the first car threw a bottle out the 
window and yelled "1920," a known slogan 
for the Shelltown gang. 
A member of the Red Steps, who was 
standing in front of La Central at that 
time, bent over while looking toward the 
first car. Alberto then fired a few shots at 
that person, hitting him in the leg and 
lower backside. 
Alberto's girlfriend immediately ducked 
down in the car and sped off. When she 
stopped for a red light, her car was 
rammed from behind twice by a large pick-
up truck which spun her car completely 
around. Alberto and his friends jumped 
out of her car and ran. After she drove 
home, she called the police. 
Alberto and six other Shelltown members 
were charged with various crimes arising 
out of the drive-by shooting. In an amend-
ed petition filed under Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 602, Alberto was alleged 
1. All statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise specified. 
Before the jurisdictional hearing, Alber-
to's case was severed from that of four of 
the defendants. Alberto and the other two 
defendants were triedj^together. At the 
close of the People's case, the juvenile 
court granted a motion to dismiss the 
charges against the other two defendants 
and the conspiracy count against Alberto 
under Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 701.1. After the defense and rebuttal 
evidence was heard, the court found the 
remaining allegations true. It also deter-
mined the attempted murder was without 
willfulness, deliberation and premeditation. 
At the dispositional hearing, Alberto was 
sentenced to the California Youth Authori-
ty for a total of seventeen years, consisting 
of a nine-year upper term for the second 
degree attempted murder, a five-year con-
secutive term for the firearm use, and a 
three-year consecutive term for committing 
the crimes as a gang member. The sen-
tence and enhancements on the assault 
with a firearm were stayed under section 
654. 
Alberto has timely appealed, launching a 
multifaceted constitutional challenge to 
section 186.22, subdivision (b) and contend-
ing the juvenile court erroneously convicted 
him of both the attempted murder and the 
assault with a firearm charges which arose 
from the same act. We affirm, briefly 
resolving his latter contention first, and 
then exploring and resolving his constitu-
tional challenges. 
2. Because the sufficiency of the evidence is not 
challenged, we briefly summarize the pertinent 
facts. 
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DISCUSSION 
I 
Section 654 s 
[1] Alberto's contention his conviction 
for the lesser offense of assault with a 
firearm4 must be reversed because section 
654 prohibits not only multiple punishment 
for offenses arising out of the same act, 
but also prohibits multiple convictions is 
meritless. Although section 654 has been 
interpreted to apply not only to individual 
criminal acts, but also to courses of con-
duct motivated by a single intent or object 
(People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 
636-639, 105 Cal.Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905), it 
only bars multiple punishment, not multiple 
conviction (People v. McFarland (1962) 58 
Cal.2d 748, 762-763, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 
P.2d 449). 
To alleviate any possible future dual pun-
ishment, our Supreme Court in People v. 
Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 361, 228 Cal. 
Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d]i?i5595 held "sentences 
imposed on [a] defendant can be enhanced 
on the basis of convictions for which he 
served a sentence; but convictions for 
which service of sentence was stayed may 
not be so used unless the Legislature ex-
plicitly declares that subsequent penal or 
administrative action may be based on such 
stayed convictions." In the absence of 
such legislation, the juvenile court below 
properly stayed the assault with a firearm 
conviction under section 654. (See id. at 
pp. 361-363, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 
595.) 
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vague on its face and its application in his 
case is overbroad thereby violating his due 
process, freedom of association and equal 
protection rights. Alberto's attack first 
concentrates on five different phrases with-
in the statute he considers vague and then 
switches to other constitutional considera-
tions. 
Although a person may not generally 
successfully challenge a statute for vague-
ness if his conduct is clearly covered by the 
statute (Bowland v. Municipal Court 
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 492, 134 Cal.Rptr. 630, 
556 P.2d 1081), a facial challenge on 
grounds of vagueness and of overbreadth 
is proper when the person challenges a 
statute which reaches "a substantial 
amount of conduct protected by the First 
Amendment " (See Kolender v. Law-
son (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 371,103 S.Ct 1855, 
1865, 75 L.Ed.2d 903.) Moreover, since Al-
berto attacks the basic provisions of section 
186.22, subdivision (b), which, if found 
vague and overbroad, would invalidate the 
entire statute, contrary to the Attorney 
General's position, Alberto has standing to 
make this constitutional attack. (See also 
People v. Green (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 
696-697, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) 
We therefore address the merits. In 
holding section 186.22, subdivision (b) is 
constitutional, we first review the applica-
ble law, the language of the statute, its 
legislative history, other California cases 
that have dealt with or construed the stat-
ute, and Alberto's specific constitutional 
complaints. 
II 
Section 186.22, Subdivision (b) 
Alberto's major contention on appeal con-
cerns section 186.22, subdivision (b), which 
allows additional punishment when a per-
son is found to have committed a felony as 
a "criminal street gang" member. He ar-
gues this statute is unconstitutionally 
3. Section 654 provides in relevant part: "An act 
cr omission which is made punishable in differ-
ent ways by different provisions of [the Penal] 
code may be punished under either of such 
provisions, but in no case can it be punished 
under more than one; . . ." 
Applicable Law 
Generally, to withstand a claim of facial 
vagueness based on due process considera-
tions, a statute must satisfy two basic re-
quirements: 
1 i3i6"First, a statute must be sufficiently 
definite to provide adequate notice of the 
4. Alberto concedes the offense of assault with a 
firearm is not a "necessarily [lesser] included 
offense" of attempted murder, but argues it is in 
effect a "related offense." 
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conduct proscribed. '[A] statute which 
either forbids or requires the doing of an 
act in terms so vague that [people] of 
common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application, violates the first essential of 
due process of law. [Citations.]' [Cita-
tions.] ' "[B]ecause we assume that [a 
person] is free to steer between lawful 
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws 
give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he [or she] may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warn-
ing." ' [Citations.] [fi] Second, a statute 
must provide sufficiently definite guide-
lines for the police in order to prevent 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment 'A vague law impermissibly del-
egates basic policy matters to policemen, 
judges and juries for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attend-
ant dangers of arbitrary and discrimina-
tory application/ [Citation.] 'Where the 
legislature fails to provide such minimal 
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit 
"a standardless sweep [that] allows po-
licemen, prosecutors, and juries to pur-
sue their personal predilections." ' [Cita-
tions.]" (People v. Superior Court 
(Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 389-390, 
250 CaLRptr. 515, 758 P.2d 1046.) 
[2] Concerning a challenge to a statute 
on grounds it is overbroad, the United 
States Supreme Court has "traditionally 
viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logi-
cally related and similar doctrines." (Ko-
lender v. Lawson, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 
359, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1859, fn. 8.) Thus "a 
governmental purpose to control or prevent 
activities constitutionally subject to state 
regulation may not be achieved by means 
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade the area of protected free-
doms." {NAACP v. Alabama (1964) 377 
U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 1313, 12 
L.Ed.2d 325.) However, to successfully 
challenge a statute as overbroad, the over-
breadth must not only be real, but must be 
substantial as well, judged by the legit-
imate reach of the law. (See Broadrick v. 
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Oklahoma (1973) 413 U.S. 601, 618, 93 
S.Ct 2908, 2919, 37 L.Ed.2d 830.) 
These specific rules supplement the fun-
damental rules for construing statutes 
which require us to initially turn to the 
words of the statute to ascertain its intent 
so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. 
(See T.M. Cobb Co, v. Superior Court 
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 273, 277, 204 Cal.Rptr. 143, 
682 P.2d 338.) As with all provisions of the 
California Penal Code, the statute at issue 
here must be construed according to the 
fair import of its words and, if any ambi-
guity is found, the legislative purpose will 
guide its interpretation. (People v. Com-
munity Release Bd, (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 
792, 795-796, 158 Cal.Rptr. 238; Daudert 
t>. People (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 580, 586,156 
Cal.Rptr. 640.) The words are generally 
construed in context with the nature and 
obvious purpose of the statute in which 
they appear and i i3i7must be harmonized in 
light of the enactment's framework as a 
whole. (See Webster v. Superior Court 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 338, 344, 250 Cal.Rptr. 268, 
758 P.2d 596.) "A statute will not be held 
void for vagueness if any reasonable and 
practical construction can be given its lan-
guage or if its terms may be made reason-
ably certain by reference to other definable 
sources." (In re Marriage of Walton 
(1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 108, 116,104 Cal.Rptr. 
472.) 
[3] The fact a word or phrase is some-
what imprecise does not per se violate due 
process requirements. (Roth t?. United 
States (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct 
1304,1312,1 L.Ed.2d 1498.) All the Consti-
tution requires is that the words "convey[ ] 
sufficiently definite warning as to the pro-
scribed conduct when measured by com-
mon understanding and practices." (Unit-
ed States v. Petrillo (1947) 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 
67 S.Ct. 1538, 1541-42, 91 L.Ed. 1877.) As 
noted by our Supreme Court in People v. 
Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1128-1129, 
80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225: 
"The law is replete with instances in 
which a person must, at his peril, govern 
his conduct by such nonmathematical 
standards as 'reasonable,' 'prudent/ 'nec-
essary and proper/ 'substantial/ and the 
23S Cal.App.3d 1319 
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like. Indeed a wide spectrum of human 
activities is regulated by such terms — 
Yet standards of this kind are not imper-
missively vague, provided their meaning 
can be objectively ascertained by refer-
ence to common experiences of man-
kind." 
With these legal principles in mind, we 
turn to the challenged statute in this case. 
B 
The Statute and Its Legislative History 
Section 186.22, subdivision (b) provides: 
"(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
any person who is convicted of a felony 
which is committed for the benefit of, at 
the direction of, or in association with 
any criminal street gang, with the specif-
ic intent to promote, further, or assist in 
any criminal conduct by gang members, 
shall upon conviction of that felony, in 
addition, and consecutive to the punish-
ment prescribed for the felony or at-
tempted felony of which he or she has 
been convicted, be punished by an addi-
tional term of one, two, or three years at 
the court's discretion. The court shall 
order the imposition of the middle term 
of circumstances in aggravation or miti-
gation. The court shall state the reasons 
for its choice of I mssentence enhance-
ments on the record at the time of sen-
tencing. [11] (2) Any person who violates 
this subdivision in the commission of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison for life, shall not be paroled 
until a minimum of 15 calendar years 
have been served." 
This section was enacted as part of the Act 
by emergency legislation in 1988. (Added 
by Stats.1988, ch. 1242, § 1, pp. 3135-3183; 
Stats.1988, ch. 1256, § 1, pp. 3182-3185.) 
The legislative materials concerning the 
Act reflect it was originally crafted to com-
bine criminal penalties and strong economic 
sanctions, including the forfeiture of speci-
fied gang member property, in response to 
the increasingly violent youthful street 
gang members throughout the state and, in 
particular, in Los Angeles. It was recog-
nized there was no existing law which 
made the commission of criminal offenses 
by individual members of street gangs sep-
arate and distinctly punished offenses, or 
which would authorize the forfeiture of the 
proceeds of gang-related activity. (Back-
ground for stated purpose of the Act in 
Sen.Com. on Judiciary report for May 26, 
1987 hearing.) 
The final analysis before the Senate 
Rules Committee, amended August 29, 
1988, reflects the bill was amended several 
times in the Assembly to clarify and 
strengthen provisions relating to criminal 
gang activities and delete the forfeiture of 
specified assets obtained through criminal 
street gang activities provisions. The final 
bill created new crimes related to criminal 
street gangs, established criminal penalties 
for "(a) willfully promoting or assisting in 
any felonious criminal conduct of a street 
gang, as defined, and (b) receiving proceeds 
derived from a pattern of criminal gang 
activity under specified conditions. The 
measure further provides for sentence en-
hancements that would result in an addi-
tional prison term for persons committing 
crimes in order to promote or assist street 
gang members." (Sen.Rules Com., Analy-
sis of Sen.Bill No. 1555 (1987-1988 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Aug. 29, 1988.) 
In addition, the bill authorized specified 
prosecution agencies and private citizens to 
bring an action to abate as a nuisance any 
building or place used for certain gang 
activities and specifically exempted from 
the Act "employees engaged in concerted 
activities for their mutual aid and protec-
tion, or the activities of labor organizations 
or their members or agents." (§ 186.23.) 
Section 186.21 of the Act specifically 
states the intent of the Legislature in en-
acting the section challenged in this case 
(and the entire Act) was to eradicate crimi-
nal street gang activity which had been 
found to be "individually and collectively" 
a "clear and present danger to public order 
and safety and are not constitutionally pro-
tected." (Ibid.) The i ^^Legislature spe-
cifically declared the Act was not intended 
to interfere with the constitutionally pro-
354 
tected rights of association5 and freedom 
of expression. (Ibid.) 
The Act in section 186.22, subdivision (a) 
makes it a criminal offense for any person 
to actively participate in any criminal street 
gang "with knowledge that its members 
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity/' and to willfully 
promote, further or assist "in any felonious 
criminal conduct by members of that 
gang." 
A "criminal street gang" is specifically 
defined under the Act in subdivision (f) of 
section 186.22, as: 
"any ongoing organization, association, 
or group of three or more persons, 
whether formal or informal, having as 
one of its primary activities the commis-
sion of one or more of the criminal acts 
enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (8),* in-
clusive, of subdivision (e), which has a 
common name or common identifying 
sign or symbol, whose members individu-
ally or collectively engage in or have 
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 
activity." 
A "pattern of criminal gang activity" is 
defined in subdivision (e) of section 186.22, 
as: 
"the commission, attempted commission, 
or solicitation of two or more of the 
following offenses, provided at least one 
of those offenses occurred after the ef-
fective date of this chapter and the last 
of those offenses occurred within three 
years after a prior offense, and the of-
fenses are committed on separate occa-
sions, or by two or more persons: (1) 
Assault with a deadly weapon or by 
means of force likely to produce great 
bodily injury [11] (2) Robbery 
[11] (3) Unlawful homicide or manslaugh-
ter [11] (4) The sale, possession for 
sale, transportation, manufacture, offer 
for sale, or offer to manufacture con-
trolled substances.... [11] (5) Shooting 
5. Although the United States and California 
Constitutions protect the right of association, 
this right may be limited upon a clear showing 
an association or organization is actively en-
gaged in lawless conduct. (Dennis v. United 
States (1951) 341 U.S. 494, 516-517, 71 S.Ct. 857, 
870-871, 95 L.Ed. 1137.) 
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at an inhabited dwelling or occupied mo-
tor vehicle.... [11] (6) Arson.... [11] (7) 
The intimidation of witnesses and vic-
tims [11] (8) Grand theft of any ve-
hicle, trailer, or vessel " 
ll32oC 
California Cases 
The constitutionality of section 186.22, 
subdivision (a) was upheld earlier this year. 
(People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 
692, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) In People v. 
Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 278 Cal. 
Rptr. 140, the defendant, convicted for his 
participation in a criminal street gang, 
brought claims of vagueness and over-
breadth similar to those which Alberto now 
raises, that key words in the statute were 
undefined, uncertain and were capable of 
including persons who became members of 
a gang out of intimidation. 
The court in Green found the terms "ac-
tively participates," "member/' "member-
ship," "criminal street gang," "knowl-
edge," "pattern of criminal gang activity," 
and "willfully promotes, furthers, or as-
sists" to be sufficiently certain to give a 
defendant "reasonable notice of the con-
duct which [the statute] prohibits and is no 
more susceptible to arbitrary enforcement 
than any other criminal statute." (People 
v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pp. 699-
704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) Although it found 
the term "felonious criminal conduct" to 
impart some uncertainty, it construed the 
provision as covering "only conduct which 
is clearly felonious, i.e., conduct which 
amounts to the commission of an offense 
punishable by imprisonment in state pris-
on." (Id. at p. 704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) As 
the court stated, "Section 186.22 does not 
prohibit membership; it prohibits the pro-
motion, furtherance or assistance in any 
felonious criminal conduct by members. 
That a member may not be a whole-hearted 
6. In 1989, section 186.22, subdivision (e) was 
amended to add the eighth crime to the list of 
offenses which constituted a "pattern of crimi-
nal gang activity." (Stats.1989, ch. 144, § 1, pp. 
966-967.) 
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participant in the felonious criminal con-
duct should have no bearing on the criminal 
liability of the person who promotes, fur-
thers or assists such conduct" (Id at p. 
700, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) 
The court in Green further noted section 
186.22 "carefully circumscribes the conduct 
to which it applies; a person cannot be 
made criminally liable under it unless he or 
she acts with the intention of promoting, 
furthering or assisting the commission of a 
felony." (People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal. 
App.3d at p. 704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) 
Three other California cases7 have spe-
cifically addressed section 186.22, subdivi-
sion (a) or (b): In re Nathaniel C. (1991) 
228 Cal.App.3d 990, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, In 
re Leland D. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 251, 
272 Cal.Rptr. 709, and In re Lincoln J. 
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 322, 272 Cal.Rptr. 
852. Although each of these cases was 
only concerned with the sufficiency of the 
ii32ievidence for the gang-related crime or 
enhancement and not with either subsec-
tion's constitutionality, interestingly, all 
three found insufficient evidence to sup-
port either the specific elements of the 
offense of participation in a criminal street 
gang or the sentence enhancement allega-
tion under subsection (b). Each case noted 
the statute explicitly defines a criminal 
street gang and a pattern of criminal activi-
ty (see In re Nathaniel G, supra, 228 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 1000-1001, 279 Cal.Rptr. 
236; In re Leland D., supra, 22Z Cal. 
App.3d at p. 258, 272 Cal.Rptr. 709; In re 
Lincoln J., supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at pp. 
327-328, 272 Cal.Rptr. 852.) 
In re Nathaniel G is perhaps the most 
instructive. The court there reviewed a 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge as to 
the same criminal street gang enhancement 
challenged here, stating the term "criminal 
street gang" is "the linchpin for the act's 
provisions. The phrase is defined specifi-
cally, and its application requires proof of 
multiple elements." (In re Nathaniel C, 
supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1000, 279 Cal. 
7. As we file this opinion, we are aware another 
Court of Appeal in People v. Gamez (1991) 235 
Cai.App.3d 957, 286 Cal.Rptr. 894 has recently 
upheld, as we do here, the facial constitutional!-
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Rptr. 236.) The court then listed the ele-
ments and, in reviewing each, noted the 
element of "pattern of criminal gang activi-
ty" for proof of the subsection (b) enhance 
ment is slightly ambiguous. It explained, 
however, because the statute requires 
"only that the offenses be 'committed on 
separate occasions, or by two or more per-
sons . . . ' " in order to constitute a "pat-
tern" (id. at p. 1003, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 
original italics), "[t]he use of the disjunc-
tive in defining 'pattern of criminal gang 
activity' means a pattern can be established 
by two or more incidents, each with a sin-
gle perpetrator, or by a single incident with 
multiple participants committing one or 
more of the specified offenses." (Ibid.) 
The court thereafter found the prosecutor 
had not presented sufficient evidence to 
constitute a "pattern." (Ibid) 
The court in Nathaniel G also narrowly 
construed the element of proof for the en-
hancement that it be shown a primary ac-
tivity of the gang is the commission of one 
or more of the eight specified offenses in 
section 186.22, subdivision (f). It stated, 
"the statute's focus is much narrower than 
general criminal conduct; evidence must 
establish that a primary activity of the 
gang is one or more of the listed offenses." 
(In re Nathaniel G, supra, 228 CaLApp.3d 
at p. 1004, 279 Cal.Rptr. 236.) 
These three cases reflect the narrow con-
struction the California courts are giving 
the sections and subsections when called 
upon to review the sufficiency of the evi-
dence for convictions under the Act. Such 
strict application lends support to our con-
clusion the statute challenged in this case 
is not unconstitutionally vague or over-
broad. 
D 
Alberto's Contentions 
[4,5] Alberto, like Green, alleges spe-
cific terms in the statute make it so un-
ty of section 186.22, subdivision (b) from vague-
ness, overbreadth, and due process challenges. 
(Id at pp. 969-976, 286 Cal.Rptr. 894.) 
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certain and so broad the statute fails to 
give fair notice of what conduct it | laaPro-
scribes, thereby inviting arbitrary enforce-
ment by local police, and includes all forms 
of association in violation of the First 
Amendment. As discussed above, two of 
the phrases Alberto challenges, "to pro-
mote, further, or assist" and "felonious 
criminal conduct," were specifically ad-
dressed by the court in Green. (People v. 
Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pp. 703-
704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) We agree with 
that court's conclusions, there is nothing 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 
about the phrase "promote, further, or as-
sist," which has been consistently used by 
the courts to describe "aiding and abet-
ting" (ibid; see People v. Beeman (1984) 
35 Cal.3d 547, 560, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 
P.2d 1318), and that "felonious criminal 
conduct" passes constitutional muster 
when that phrase is narrowly construed to 
only pertain to conduct which is purely 
felonious, i.e., punishable in state prison. 
(People v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 703-704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140.) 
[6] Alberto also claims the term "bene-
fit o f contained in the enhancement sub-
section is impermissibly ambiguous be-
cause the Legislature may have only meant 
for the enhancement to apply when a mone-
tary profit is made by a gang member 
committing a crime. Because "benefit" 
may be defined as anything contributing to 
an improvement in condition, advantage, 
help, or profit, Alberto argues the phrase 
"benefit of" makes the statute overbroad, 
catching within its web those who merely 
assist gang members and make no mone-
tary profit. Such a narrow construction of 
the term is unwarranted. 
The Legislature used the words "profits" 
and "proceeds" concerning forfeiture in the 
findings and declarations of the Act 
(§ 186.21); it knew these words, but chose 
not to use them in defining the elements of 
the enhancement Thus it is only common 
sense the Legislature did not intend such a 
restricted view as Alberto offers. Alberto 
takes the word "benefit" out of context 
and treats it in a vacuum. When it is read 
in context with the other words in the 
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enhancement subdivision, it becomes clear 
the Legislature intended "benefits" to be 
interpreted by the qualifying language of 
the statute, thereby limiting the scope of 
such conduct to only those acts committed 
"with the specific intent to promote, fur-
ther, or assist in any criminal conduct by 
gang members...." (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) 
As so defined, the potential for vagueness 
or overbreadth is eliminated. 
[7] Further, Alberto's attempt to create 
an ambiguity out of the phrase, "and the 
last of those offenses occurred within three 
years after a prior offense," contained in 
section 186.22, subdivision (e) as part of the 
definition of "pattern of criminal gang ac-
tivity," is meritless. His anticipated sce-
narios of gang members being charged for 
crimes in the future for which they had no 
knowledge and in which they did not partic-
ipate are absurd. The Act must be read as 
a whole. Under section 186.22, subdivision 
(a), no gang member 11323will be prosecuted 
for a future offense unless that person 
"actively participates in any criminal street 
gang with knowledge that its members en-
gage in or have engaged in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity, and who willfully 
promotes, furthers, or assists in any feloni-
ous criminal conduct by members of that 
gang. . . ." 
[8] Nor is Alberto's attack on the 
phrase "primary activities" valid. Alberto 
argues the phrase is vague and enforce-
ment would be arbitrary based on who 
makes the decision of what a gang's "pri-
mary activities" are, criminal or social. 
However, the Act specifically lists the felo-
nious conduct required to come under its 
spell. In order to enforce this provision, 
the evidence adduced at the trial would be 
weighed by the trier of fact as in any other 
criminal case to determine whether the ele-
ment of "primary activities" had been prov-
en. 
[9] Alberto's due process argument 
there are no standards governing the exer-
cise of the discretion granted by the Act is 
likewise invalid. A similar due process ar-
gument was raised and rejected in People 
v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pages 
698-704, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140. We agree with 
that analysis. Section 186.22, subdivisions 
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/e) and (f) specifically designate what 
crimes a gang must be involved in before a 
member who knowingly and willfully "pro-
motes, furthers, or assists in" that conduct 
can be found guilty of the enhancement. 
As in all criminal cases, the trier of fact 
then determines whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support the allegations. No 
unfettered discretion is shown. 
[10] Further, Alberto's contention the 
"specific intent" phrase of the statute does 
not save it from being too vague is spe-
cious. The plain language of the statute 
reflects the "specific intent" necessary is 
"to promote, further, or assist in any crimi-
nal conduct by gang members — " 
(§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Such is adequate no-
tice of what conduct is proscribed. As 
Alberto concedes, the inclusion of a "specif-
ic intent" in the terms of a statute will 
generally overcome any potential vague-
ness problem; persons of ordinary intelli-
gence will not have to guess at the applica-
bility of the statute. (See People v. Supe-
rior Court (Caswell), supra, 46 Cal.3d at 
pp. 390-391, 250 Cal.Rptr. 515, 758 P.2d 
1046.) 
Alberto's additional complaints that the 
statute is vague because it does not contain 
a "scienter" requirement and the prosecu-
tion wrongfully analogized the specific in-
tent requirement with the "knowledge" re-
quirement of the crime of conspiracy are 
also unfounded. Nothing in the record 
shows the juvenile court judge was mislead 
by the prosecutor's argument regarding 
I i324Conspiratorial knowledge, and the stat-
ute here is plainly directed at conduct, not 
on mere knowledge of a criminal activity. 
[Ill Moreover, because the plain lan-
guage of the statute requires "active par-
ticipation in criminal gang activity," Alber-
to's assertion that section 186.22 is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad is easily rejected. 
The requirements a person know of the 
group's criminal activity and intentionally 
further the group's illegal conduct limit the 
Act's application to those gang members 
who actually engage in criminal activity. 
Alberto's attempt to twist around the 
terms of the statute to create vagueness 
and overbreadth is similar to the arcru-
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ments concerning active participation and 
membership addressed and rejected in Peo-
ple v. Green, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at 
pages 699-701, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140. For the 
reasons stated there, and above, we reject 
Alberto's argument. 
[12] Finally, Alberto claims he is denied 
the equal protection of the laws because 
the enhancement he was charged with falls 
in the same category as the crime of con-
spiracy which includes numerous "proce-
dural safeguards" section 186.22 does not. 
Conspiracy, however, is a different breed 
of animal. Its gravamen is the agreement 
with others to commit an offense. (People 
v. Horn (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 296, 115 Cal. 
Rptr. 516, 524 P.2d 1300.) Section 186.22's 
gravamen is active participation in feloni-
ous criminal gang activity under certain 
defined circumstances. The enhancement 
of committing gang-related felony crimes 
can be committed without an agreement to 
first commit the crime; it can be committed 
merely on an aiding and abetting theory. 
Because equal protection only ensures per-
sons similarly situated with equal treat-
ment, no denial of equal protection is 
shown. 
Conclusion 
We decline to frustrate the Legislature's 
clear intent in enacting the statute at issue 
here. (Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 
Cal.3d 257, 272, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 
732.) Because the Legislature so carefully 
affirmed the right of freedom of associa-
tion and its conviction not to interfere with 
those rights, and used limiting language to 
define the various criminal actions pro-
scribed, we conclude that under both the 
federal and state Constitutions, section 
186.22, subdivision (b) provides adequate 
notice of the conduct proscribed and does 
not unnecessarily sweep too broadly so as 
to invade protected areas of association; 
the statute is not void for vagueness or 
overbreadth. Section 186.22, subdivision 
(b) is thus facially constitutional as applied 
to Alberto. 
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j^sDISPOSITION 
Judgment affirmed. 
WIENER, Acting PJ., and 
RODRIGUEZ, J.,* concur. 
